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ABSTRACT
As numerous scholars have noted, the law takes a strikingly incoherent
approach to adolescent reproduction. States overwhelmingly allow a teenage
girl to independently consent to pregnancy care and medical treatment for
her child, and even to give up her child for adoption, all without notice to her
parents, but require parental notice or consent for abortion. This Article
argues that this oft-noted contradiction in the law on teenage reproductive
decision making is in fact not as contradictory as it first appears. A closer
look at the law’s apparently conflicting approaches to teenage abortion and
teenage childbirth exposes common ground that scholars have overlooked.
This Article is the first to compare the full spectrum of minors’ reproductive
rights and the first to unmask deep similarities in the law on adolescent reproduction – in particular an undercurrent of desire to punish (female) teenage sexuality, whether pregnant girls choose abortion or childbirth. It
demonstrates that in practice, the law undermines adolescents’ reproductive
rights, whichever path of pregnancy resolution they choose. At the same time
that the law thwarts adolescents’ access to abortion care, it also fails to protect adolescents’ rights as parents. The Article’s analysis shows that these
two superficially conflicting sets of rules in fact work in tandem to enforce a
traditional gender script – that self-sacrificing mothers should give birth and
give up their infants to better circumstances, no matter the emotional costs to
themselves. This Article also suggests novel policy solutions to the difficulties posed by adolescent reproduction by urging reforms that look to third
parties other than parents or the State to better support adolescent decision
making relating to pregnancy and parenting.

*

Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. B.A., University of
Michigan, 1995; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1998. For their helpful comments on
prior drafts, I am grateful to Susan Frelich Appleton, Caitlin Borgmann, Cynthia
Godsoe, Tristin Green, and Rachel Rebouché. This Article also benefited from feedback from participants at the AALS Annual Meeting Children and the Law Section
program; New York Family Law Scholars Workshop at Cardozo Law School; CUNY
Law School Faculty Forum; Pace Law School Faculty Colloquium; Family Law
Scholars and Teachers Conference; and University of San Francisco School of Law
Faculty Scholarship Workshop. Special thanks to Katherine Franke, Suzanne Goldberg, and the Center for Gender and Sexuality Law at Columbia Law School for
providing an engaging and inspiring community while drafting this Article. Thanks
to Amy Wright for her always outstanding services as Research Librarian. Thanks to
Mairead Donohey, Masha Litvinov, and Karen Majovski for excellent research assistance, and thanks to the editors of the Missouri Law Review for thoughtful editorial
suggestions.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 19

128

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ 127
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................ 128
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 129
I. PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE STATE: A CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING
ACT ........................................................................................................... 133
A. Privacy and Parents’ Rights ................................................................ 133
B. Privacy and Adolescents’ Rights ......................................................... 136
C. Conflicts in the Law on Adolescent Sexuality and Reproduction ........ 138
1. Sex Education ............................................................................... 139
2. Contraception................................................................................ 140
3. STI Treatment ............................................................................... 142
4. Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Medical Care for Minors’ Children .. 142
5. Adoption ....................................................................................... 143
6. Abortion Exceptionalism .............................................................. 144
II. MINORS, PARENTS, AND MINORS AS PARENTS ............................................ 146
A. Minor Parents’ Parental Rights in Theory .......................................... 147
B. Minor Parents’ Parental Rights in Practice ........................................ 160
1. Minor Parents and the Child Welfare System ............................... 162
2. Minor Parents and Adoption Law ................................................. 171
III. A THIRD WAY: THIRD PARTY SUPPORT FOR PREGNANT OR PARENTING
ADOLESCENTS ........................................................................................... 185
A. Science, Politics, and Youth Law: Do Adolescents Need Adult
Guidance?.......................................................................................... 187
B. Third Parties in Private Family Law and Possibilities for Reform ..... 192
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 204

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/19

2

Manian: Minors, Parents, and Minor Parents

2016]

MINORS, PARENTS, AND MINOR PARENTS

129

INTRODUCTION
When does childhood end? The answer to this question determines the
legal rights of youth in all arenas of life.1 Yet, as many scholars have noted,
the law lacks a coherent approach to defining the end of childhood, the beginning of adulthood, or a space in between.2 Those categorized as children
for most purposes can be criminally liable as adults.3 Those categorized as
adults for most purposes cannot legally purchase alcohol.4 Those who many
view as falling in between the categories of child or adult – adolescents – are
invisible under the law.5
The law’s incoherent approach to adolescent sexuality and reproduction
is especially striking. For example, in states with parental notice or consent
mandates, which represent the vast majority of states, teenage girls facing an
unplanned pregnancy must obtain permission from a parent or, alternatively,
from a judge to receive abortion care.6 In contrast, states typically exempt
other similarly sensitive medical care from parental involvement, especially
medical care related to sexual activity.7 All states allow minors to obtain

1. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 547, 547–48 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence]
(“[T]he answer to the question, ‘When does childhood end?’ is different in different
policy contexts. This variation makes it difficult to discern a coherent image of legal
childhood. Youths who are in elementary school may be deemed adults for purposes
of assigning criminal responsibility and punishment, while seniors in high school
cannot vote and most college students are legally prohibited from drinking.”).
2. See, e.g., Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C.
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 354–55 (2006).
3. Id. at 315.
4. Id. at 297–98.
5. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 556 (footnote
omitted) (“Although lawmakers have occasionally recognized the distinctive character of adolescence, more typically this transitional stage is invisible, and adolescents
are incorporated into the binary legal categories of childhood or adulthood.”); Rachel
Rebouché, Parental Involvement Laws and New Governance, 34 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 175, 206–07 (2011) (noting the invisibility of adolescence in the law). In
this Article, I use the term “minor” to refer to persons under the age of eighteen. In
this Article, I use the terms “minors,” “children,” “juveniles,” and “youth” interchangeably to generally refer to persons under the age of eighteen. I use the terms
“adolescent” or “teenager” to refer to persons approximately between the ages of
thirteen and eighteen. See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging
a Common Understanding of Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-making
and Criminal Responsibility, 6 NEV. L.J. 927, 929 n.2 (2006) (discussing age-based
differentiation in legal rules and noting important developmental differences between
pre-adolescents and adolescents).
6. See Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 572 &
n.98.
7. See id. at 567–68.
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treatment for sexually transmitted infections without notifying their parents,
and many states allow minors to receive prescription contraceptives without
involving a parent.8 States also overwhelmingly allow a teenage girl to independently consent to pregnancy care and medical treatment for her child, and
even to give up her child for adoption, all without notice to her parents.9 Yet,
these same states mandate parental notice or consent for abortion.10 If teenagers are too immature to make the decision to obtain an abortion without
parental or judicial supervision, how can states conclude that those same
teenagers are mature enough to decide to continue a pregnancy and raise a
child, or to relinquish the child for adoption, all without the guidance of an
adult?
This Article argues that this oft-noted contradiction in the law on adolescent reproduction is in fact not as contradictory as it first appears. A closer
look at the law’s apparently conflicting approaches to teenage reproductive
decision making reveals common ground that scholars have overlooked. This
Article is the first to compare the full spectrum of minors’ reproductive rights
and the first to unmask deep similarities in the law on adolescent reproduction. Using a wider lens to assess minors’ reproductive rights, this Article
compares the law on minors’ rights to obtain abortion care with minors’ parental rights. Through this wider lens, this Article reveals that in practice, the
result has been not so much that the two areas of law conflict, but instead,
that in reality, the law undermines adolescents’ rights, whichever path of
pregnancy resolution they choose. At the same time that the law thwarts
teenage girls’ access to abortion care, it also fails to protect their rights as
parents.
A more expansive inquiry into adolescents’ reproductive rights demonstrates that the conflicting doctrines in practice work in tandem to enforce a
traditional gender script: namely, self-sacrificing mothers should give birth
and give up their children to better circumstances than teenage parenting presumably provides, regardless of the emotional pain these young mothers
might suffer as a result of relinquishment. The notion that the law should
mete out punishment onto sexually irresponsible women, such as by denying
access to abortion or removing their children, has a long history.11 The im8. See id.; Cunningham, supra note 2, at 354.
9. See Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 567–68.
10. See Jennifer Durcan & Annette R. Appell, Minor Birth Mothers and Consent

to Adoption: An Anomaly in Youth Law, 5 ADOPTION Q. 69 (2001); Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making For and By Children: Tensions Between Parent, State,
and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 323–24 (1994).
11. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and Regret, 23 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 255, 323–25 (2011) (describing gender scripts revealed by case law on
reproduction and regret); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Untying the Moral Knot of Abortion,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299, 1308-10 (2014) (discussing theme of punishing women’s sexual irresponsibility in abortion restrictions); Carol Sanger, Separating from
Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 377 (1996) [hereinafter Sanger, Separating from
Children] (describing idealized notions of maternal sacrifice, in particular that moth-
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pact of the law’s punishment falls most harshly on adolescents from poor and
struggling families, as these youth have the fewest resources to obtain either
judicial bypass for an abortion or support for making parenting decisions.
While a superficial review of the law on adolescent reproduction suggests conflict and incoherence, a closer look at the reality of minor parents’
parental rights unmasks a perverse coherence to the law. The conflicting
doctrines on abortion and childbirth obscure how both abortion law and the
law dealing with minors as parents take highly skeptical views of adolescents’ rights to make reproductive decisions and mask how these laws serve
as a means to enforce traditional gender norms. This Article uses family law
doctrines and practices as a lens to shed light on the law’s seemingly contradictory approaches to teenage sexuality, pregnancy, parenting, and abortion.
Family law’s prism helps to explain these conflicts in novel ways. This Article argues that the surface incoherence in the law regulating adolescent sexuality and reproduction stems, in part, from traditional rules governing parental
rights. Current law in this context, although appearing to have made progress
for adolescent rights, in fact maps onto conventional rules about parents’
rights to control their children’s upbringing and the narrow exemptions to
those rules.
For example, the rule that adolescents can freely consent to medical
treatment for sexually transmitted infections represents an application of the
traditional exemption from parental control for medical emergencies, rather
than a recognition of adolescents’ right to sexual or health care autonomy.
Similarly, this Article argues that the law grants minor parents full parental
autonomy, at least in theory, because of a reflexive desire to assert the rights
of persons categorized as parents – not out of respect for a minor’s right to be
a parent. In other words, the law resists any overt reduction of parental
rights, including for minor parents, out of fear that explicitly undermining
even minors’ parental rights would also threaten the authority and certainty of
the traditional parental rights model reserved for most adults.12
Yet, while paying lip service to the parental rights of minors in theory,
the law fails to support adolescent parenting in substance. We can see this
through a deeper examination of the areas of family law that deal directly
with minors as parents: child welfare law and adoption law. Closer study of
child welfare and adoption practices reveals that the rigid notions about parental rights that inform the law’s superficial grant of autonomy to teenage
parents do not carry through to substantively protect minor parents’ abilities
to parent their children. In some contexts, as in adoption law’s right to relinquish, the law’s grant of adult-like parental “rights” to minors may actually
serve to undermine minors’ parental interests by making it easier to remove
ers who fail to separate when conditions call for it are regarded as “misguided, selfish,
unnatural”).
12. Although, in theory, adult parents’ rights to custody and control of their children receive full constitutional protection, the parental rights of marginalized groups –
particularly poor racial minorities – have long been threatened by state scrutiny under
the child welfare system. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing child welfare law).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 19

132

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

infants from their care. Minor mothers especially face the worst of both
worlds – the lack of governmental support endured by adult parents and the
intensive oversight generally enforced upon minors.
The last part of this Article takes a prescriptive turn. It suggests that we
could better support adolescents’ decisions about pregnancy and parenting by
turning to third party adults other than parents or state agents – such as judges
and child welfare officials – who wield heavy-handed authority over minors.
Depending on the context, third parties who might serve as beneficial resources for pregnant or parenting minors include extended family members,
neighbors, and community members; health care professionals; and lawyers
acting on behalf of the minor.
Abortion law, child welfare law, and adoption law all purport to serve
two primary goals: to ensure sound decision making for pregnant or parenting
adolescents and to protect the well being of children. Yet, in practice, the law
too often fails to achieve these goals. Parents may be unsupportive or unavailable to adolescents, and state agents may be motivated by biases and concerns that conflict with pregnant or parenting minors’ own interests. Although some adolescents can make sound reproductive decisions without being required to consult with an adult, political resistance to increased adolescent autonomy – particularly around sexuality and reproduction – remains
formidable. Furthermore, scientific research on adolescence suggests that
some adolescents would benefit from adult guidance when faced with difficult, consequential decisions. Therefore, law makers should consider more
effective policy solutions beyond the parent/state binary to achieve the stated
aims of securing sound reproductive decision making and protecting the well
being of both pregnant adolescents and their infants. The final section of this
Article considers potential policy reforms incorporating third parties and urges further conversation in this direction.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I grounds the discussion by
providing a brief overview of the legal history of parental rights over children, primarily focusing on constitutional decisions on privacy rights within
the family. These decisions set forth the parameters balancing parents’ rights,
children’s rights, and the State’s interest in protecting children that guide the
laws governing adolescent autonomy. Part I then describes the law’s inconsistent approach to whether and when it grants adolescents’ autonomy in sexual and reproductive decision making, particularly with regard to teenage
abortion versus childbirth.
Part II applies longstanding conventions on the scope of parental rights
to help explain the inconsistencies in the law governing teenagers’ sexual and
reproductive autonomy and unmasks the traditional gender scripts animating
the law. Part II demonstrates the stronghold that traditional conceptions of
parental control continue to exert, even in areas of the law that appear to expand adolescent autonomy. This Part also examines the treatment of minor
parents in the child welfare system and in adoption law to demonstrate that
the law in practice undermines minor parents’ parental rights, both for marginalized adolescents and for some youth from less marginalized groups.
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Strikingly, in their operation, the conflicting legal rules on adolescent abortion and parenting serve a similar end – the law acts as a means to punish
female adolescent sexual transgression of purity norms.
Part III argues that interventions that look to third party adults may help
to create space for adolescence in the law by addressing the absence of supportive parents and providing alternatives to overly restrictive state interventions that undermine minors’ reproductive decision making. Although private family law doctrine has increasingly recognized the important role that
adults other than parents play in children’s lives, third parties have not been
incorporated consistently or effectively in the law of adolescent abortion or
adolescent parenting. Part III explores several possibilities for regulatory
reform and generally urges a conversation about how the law could
acknowledge the unique needs of adolescents by providing options between
the extremes of autonomy and authority of parent or state.

I. PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE STATE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
BALANCING ACT
The conventional framing of the family within U.S. law “embrace[s] the
image of a triangle to describe the allocation of legal authority over childrearing” with parents, children, and the State standing at each point of the triangle.13 Balancing the interests of child, parent, and State has been an ongoing
struggle at the federal and state levels across various family law issues. At
times, the law portrays parents’ and children’s liberty interests as aligned
against encroachment by the State. At other times, the law treats parents’ and
children’s rights as in conflict, and the State acts as arbiter between the two.14
In this Part, this Article grounds the discussion that follows by providing the
legal context for rules governing parents, minors, and minor parents. First,
this Article briefly summarizes the law on parental rights and children’s
rights, focusing primarily on constitutional decisions protecting privacy within the family. Next, this Article provides an overview of state law governing
minors’ sexual and reproductive decision making to demonstrate the law’s
inconsistent doctrinal approaches to granting minors autonomy.

A. Privacy and Parents’ Rights
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that children possess constitutional rights, minors’ rights have long been curtailed based on the state’s
interest in protecting vulnerable and immature minors and the state’s deference to parents’ constitutional right to control their children’s upbringing.
13. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833,
833 (2007) (“Family Law in the United States has long embraced the image of a triangle to describe the allocation of legal authority over childrearing. Parents, children,
and the state stand at the three points of this triangle.”).
14. See id.
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The Court long ago established that parents possess a fundamental right to
raise their children as they see fit. In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court
struck down a state law forbidding education in a language other than English
on the ground that due process protects parents’ rights to “establish a home
and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own.”15 Two
years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and
Mary, the Court found that an Oregon law prohibiting parochial school education “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”16 Over
the years, the Court has repeatedly upheld parents’ fundamental right of authority over their children, stating that “it is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations that the state can neither
supply nor hinder.”17
Most recently, in Troxel v. Granville, the Court reaffirmed the extensive
line of precedent granting parents the fundamental right to raise their children
without interference from the government, although in a notably circumscribed manner.18 In Troxel, Justice O’Connor’s controlling plurality opinion
held that courts must give “special weight” to a fit parent’s determination of
her child’s best interests, but otherwise established no broad rule limiting
third party, non-parent visitation laws.19 Although Troxel granted a sliver of
deference to parental rights, the plurality also acknowledged the “changing
realities of the American family” and confirmed the important role that third
parties play in today’s pluralistic families: “The demographic changes of the
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. . . .
[P]ersons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing.”20 Minority communities
in particular rely heavily on parental surrogates in childrearing, as a number
15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).
16. 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
17. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). See also Parham v. J.R.,

442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor
children. . . . The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (upholding Amish parents’
right to remove children from school).
18. 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
19. Id. at 58. The various opinions in Troxel “scrupulously avoid[ed] any strong
endorsement of parental rights.” Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635,
639 (2002) [hereinafter Buss, “Parental” Rights]. The decision, therefore, has had
limited practical impact and “induced no startling or radical changes with respect to
third-party visitation.” See John Dewitt Gregory, The Detritus of Troxel, 40 FAM.
L.Q. 133, 144 (2006).
20. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63–64.
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of scholars have discussed.21 Numerous cases post-Troxel permit nonparents
to exercise “custodial fragments” – most importantly visitation rights – which
represent a significant intrusion upon parental control over their child’s upbringing.22
Troxel noted that a parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care
of his or her children has never been unlimited.23 The Court has consistently
balanced parents’ rights against the state’s independent interest in protecting
the welfare of its youth. The state’s parens patriae power gives it leeway to
limit parental authority if the State has sufficient justification to conclude that
a parental decision would be harmful to the child’s health and development. 24
For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld the application of
child labor laws to a nine-year-old girl who was soliciting for the Jehovah’s
Witness religion at her parents’ direction.25 The Court emphasized that the
state possesses the authority to “guard the general interest in youth’s well
being” and, therefore, can “restrict the parent’s control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other
ways.”26
The state’s power to circumscribe parents’ constitutional right to custody and control over their child’s upbringing has particularly been reinforced
in cases where a parent’s decision making may place the child’s health in
jeopardy. Numerous cases have upheld the state’s power to limit a parent’s
decision-making authority where such authority presents a significant risk of
harm to a child’s health.27 The important governmental interest in protecting
21. See, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
47, 57–63 (2007); Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know
Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 865, 869–72 (2003).
22. Buss, “Parental” Rights, supra note 19, at 635–36 (criticizing Troxel’s approach); KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING CHANGE: QUEER PARENTS, JUDGES, AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 115–16 (2009) (discussing postTroxel cases granting third parties rights to continue their relationship with a child
against a biological parent’s wishes).
23. RICHMAN, supra note 22, at 87.
24. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968); Pierce v. Soc’y of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
25. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–70 (1944).
26. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted).
27. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 471 (1990) (“[W]here parental involvement threatens to harm the child, the parent’s authority must yield.”). See also
In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 654 (1970 N.Y. Fam. Ct.) (“[The] court’s authority
to deal with the abused, neglected or physically handicapped child is not limited to
‘drastic situations’ or to those which constitute a ‘present emergency’, but that the
Court has a ‘wide discretion’ to order medical or surgical care and treatment for an
infant even over parental objection, if in the Court’s judgment the health, safety or
welfare of the child requires it.”). See B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by
and on Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL’Y 37, 41–43 (2012) (discussing minors’ ability to consent to medical health

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 19

136

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

children’s health plays a large role in the debates on adolescents’ abilities to
access sensitive medical treatment, particularly related to sexuality and reproduction.

B. Privacy and Adolescents’ Rights
In the context of sexual and reproductive decision making, the Court has
struggled to find a way to balance the respective interests of child, parent, and
state. Following the Court’s decisions upholding adults’ right to access contraceptives, in Carey v. Population Services International, the Court declared
unconstitutional laws restricting minors’ access to contraception.28 Carey
acknowledged that the question of the state’s power to regulate constitutionally protected conduct when engaged in by minors “is a vexing one, perhaps
not susceptible of precise answer,”29 but nevertheless, the Court struck down
a state law prohibiting distribution of contraception to those under sixteen.30
Carey found that the State’s desire to deter minors’ sexual activity “by increasing the hazards attendant on it” was insufficient justification to infringe
upon a minor’s constitutional rights.31
With respect to abortion, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bellotti
v. Baird (Bellotti II) in 1979,32 laws requiring parental involvement in minor
care); Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of
Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
251, 262 (2005) (noting that parents have both the right to consent to their children’s
healthcare and the responsibility to seek medical care for their children). States often
intervene when parents deny children medical treatment based on religious beliefs,
since “the State’s interest in the safety and well-being of minors may compel medical
treatment for a child despite objections by the parents that are based upon their religious beliefs.” Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130, 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985), vacated, 510 A.2d 562 (Md. 1986).
28. 431 U.S. 678, 678 (1977).
29. Id. at 692.
30. Id. at 681–82.
31. Id. at 694. See also B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity,
64 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1307–08 (2015) (analyzing various opinions of the justices in the
Carey decision).
32. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). See
also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (holding
unconstitutional New Hampshire law barring minor from obtaining abortion care
without parental notice even in medical emergencies); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S.
292 (1997) (judicial bypass provision allowing waiver of notice requirement if notification was not in minor’s best interest was sufficient to protect minor’s right to abortion under a Montana statute); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (holding parental consent provision of the Pennsylvania abortion statute does
not impose an undue burden); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (holding
that a Minnesota statute requiring both parents be notified when a minor attempts to
get an abortion was unconstitutional, but upholding the allowance of a judicial bypass
for the requirement of parental notice); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health,
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abortion decisions have been constitutional, provided that the laws offer judicial bypass as an alternative to parental involvement.33 Bellotti II found that
minors’ right to access abortion could be restricted for three reasons: “[T]he
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.”34 The Bellotti II Court held that parental consent laws with an expeditious and confidential judicial bypass alternative appropriately balance
the minor’s constitutional right to access abortion with both the parental right
to control their child’s upbringing and the state’s interest in protecting vulnerable and immature minors.35 Importantly, Bellotti II made clear that parents could not exercise a veto over a minor’s decision to obtain an abortion;
rather, parental or judicial involvement served to ensure better decision making because “immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed
choices.”36
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which reassessed and ultimately upheld aspects of the core right to access abortion established in Roe v. Wade,
the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of parental consent laws so long as
those laws provided for judicial bypass.37 Judges in bypass hearings have the
authority to either grant consent for a minor’s abortion care or to block access

497 U.S. 502 (1990) (holding Ohio statute requiring parental notice be given by physician performing abortion constitutional); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)
(upholding a Utah statute requiring physician to notify the parents of a minor seeking
an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding a blanket parental consent requirement for minors is unconstitutional).
33. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622 (plurality opinion); Amanda Dennis et al., The Impact of Laws Requiring Parental Involvement for Abortion: A Literature Review,
GUTTMACHER INST. 3 (Mar. 2009), www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ParentalInvolvement
Laws.pdf.
34. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634 (plurality opinion).
35. Id. See also Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75
(1995) (providing judicial framework for Michigan judges deciding whether a minor
girl may have an abortion without the consent of a parent under the Michigan Parental
Rights Restoration Act).
36. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 640 (plurality opinion). Bellotti II emphasized that no
third party could veto a mature minor’s abortion decision; therefore, a minor whose
parent denied consent could then seek permission from a judge. Id. at 649. Furthermore, a judge could not substitute his or her own judgment if the minor was found to
be sufficiently mature to make an informed decision. See id. at 643–50.
37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899. See also Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320 (reaffirming that
parental involvement laws must also have a health exception for medical emergencies). The Court has made it clear that parental consent laws must have a judicial
bypass option, but it remains unclear whether parental notification laws for unemancipated minors constitutionally require judicial bypass procedures. See Erin Helling
& Jenny Nam, Eleventh Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: Health Care
Law Chapter: Abortion, 11 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 341, 351 (2010).
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to abortion care without parental involvement.38 As discussed in the next
Part, these requirements in the abortion context stand in contrast to the relatively greater autonomy granted to minors seeking medical care for sexual
health, pregnancy, and childbirth.

C. Conflicts in the Law on Adolescent Sexuality and Reproduction
Over the past several decades, states have greatly expanded minors’ authority to consent to health care without involving their parents. Although
minors generally must obtain parental consent prior to receiving medical
treatment, states have permitted adolescents to more freely obtain treatment
for sensitive medical care related to drug addiction, mental health, and sexuality.39 The landscape of the law governing teenagers’ autonomy in sexual
and reproductive decision making is quite varied across the states and is often
contradictory in its approach. This Part describes those inconsistencies across
a wide range of activities related to adolescent sexuality and reproduction.
One useful way to divide up these issues is by assessing “pre-sexual activity” decisions versus “post-sexual activity” decisions, since that dividing
line explains controversies over approaches to adolescent autonomy. Granting adolescents autonomy over their “pre-sexual activity” decisions – for
instance, providing information or services that may help a minor who is considering engaging in sex, such as access to comprehensive sexual education
and contraception – has been much more controversial. There continues to be
controversy about whether teenagers should be permitted to avail themselves
of comprehensive sex education and contraceptives without parental notice or
consent.40 In contrast, allowing teenagers to have greater decision-making
autonomy with regard to “post-sexual activity” decisions, including treatment
related to the consequences of having sex, such as medical care for sexually
transmitted infections (“STIs”), pregnancy, and childbirth, has been much
less controversial, with the exception of abortion.41 Almost all states permit
teens to make STI and pregnancy treatment decisions without parental involvement.42 An overview of the law in this context shows the states’ incon-

38. See generally Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 35 (describing judicial bypass
hearings in Michigan and in comparison with other states).
39. See Wadlington, supra note 10, at 323–24.
40. State Policies in Brief: Sex and HIV Education, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 3
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SE.pdf.
41. See State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to STI Services, GUTTMACHER
INST.
1,
2
(Jan.
1,
2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MASS.pdf; State Policies in Brief:
Minors’ Rights as Parents, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 1 (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MRP.pdf.
42. See State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to STI Services, supra note 41, at
2; State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to Prenatal Care, GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 2
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MAPC.pdf.
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sistent approaches to granting adolescents autonomy over their sexual and
reproductive decision making.

1. Sex Education
Whether teenagers should possess the ability to access comprehensive
sex education and prescription contraceptives without parental involvement
remains controversial, largely on the basis that these “pre-sexual activity”
decisions fall within the scope of parents’ right to control their children’s
upbringing.43 With respect to sex education, some parents’ rights groups
have argued that parents should determine whether their child should receive
any sex education, abstinence-only education, or more comprehensive sex
education.44 Youth advocates, in contrast, assert that minors engage in sexual
activity whether their parents consent or not, so the state has an obligation to
accurately and comprehensively educate minors on sexual health.45
It is up to the states whether they choose to mandate sex education or
leave it up to localities to provide as they see fit.46 Only twenty states and the
District of Columbia mandate sex education and HIV education.47 Thirteen
states mandate HIV education only.48 Like the decision to provide sex education, it is similarly up to the states to mandate the scope of the content of the
education or to leave it up to the localities.49 Although recent studies have
concluded that abstinence-only education is ineffective, the debate over sex
education has led to a number of specific content requirements in favor of
it.50 Regardless of the state or local mandates regarding the provision of sex
education, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia allow parents to opt
their children out of sex education or HIV education.51 Thus, in the majority
43. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, The Failure of Abstinence-Only Education: Minors Have a Right to Honest Talk About Sex, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
12, 49–50 (2006).
44. See,
e.g.,
NYC
PARENTS’
CHOICE
COALITION,
http://www.nycparentschoice.org/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
45. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 43, at 61–62; Cynthia Dailard, Legislating
Against Arousal: The Growing Divide Between Federal Policy and Teenage Sexual
Behavior, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 12 (2006).
46. See State Policies in Brief: Sex and HIV Education, supra note 40, at 3.
47. Id. (Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia).
48. Id. (Alabama, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin).
49. See id.
50. CHRISTOPHER TRENHOLM ET AL., MATHEMATICA POL’Y RESEARCH, INC.
IMPACTS OF FOUR TITLE V, SECTION 510 ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 51, 59
(Apr.
2007),
http://www.mathematicampr.com/~/media/publications/PDFs/impactabstinence.pdf.
51. State Policies in Brief: Sex and HIV Education, supra note 40, at 3 (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
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of states, parents may exercise a complete veto power over their teenagers’
access to sex education.52

2. Contraception
The Supreme Court has extended the constitutional right to access contraception to minors,53 and many states have expressly allowed minors to
consent to prescription contraceptive services without parental involvement.
54
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia explicitly allow all minors
to consent to prescription contraceptive services.55 Twenty-five states explicitly permit minors to consent to prescription contraception if they meet certain requirements, such as being married, being a parent, having been pregnant before, or having a special health need.56 The remaining four states have
no explicit law on a minor’s ability to obtain contraceptive services, but even
where a state has no relevant law, physicians may commonly provide medical
care to a mature minor without parental consent as a matter of practice.57
The policy debate surrounding adolescent access to contraception rages
on today.58 Those in favor of unfettered access to contraception argue that
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
52. Id.
53. Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 697–99 (1977).
54. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services,
GUTTMACHER INST. 1, 2 (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_MACS.pdf.
55. Id. at 2 (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming).
56. Id. Twenty-one states allow married minors to consent to contraceptive
services. Id. Three states allow minors to consent to contraception upon advice from
a physician to prevent physical hazard. Id. Six states allow minors with children to
consent to contraception. Id. Six states allow minors who are or have been pregnant
to consent to contraception. Id. Eleven states allow minors to consent that meet certain other eligibility requirements. Id. Four states have no explicit policy on the
matter. Id.
57. Id. No state or federal laws require minors to get parental permission to
access contraception, although some proposals to require parental permission have
surfaced. See Parental Consent and Notice for Contraceptives Threatens Teen Health
and Constitutional Rights, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.
reproductiverights.org/document/parental-consent-and-notice-for-contraceptivesthreatens-teen-health-and-constitutional-rig.
58. For example, the FDA’s politically charged decision to limit adolescent access to emergency contraception led to a federal lawsuit – although emergency contraception blurs the pre-sex/post-sex dividing line it has been debated about similarly
to traditional contraception regarding its use by teenagers, i.e., whether it will encour-
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adolescents will engage in sexual activity with or without parental consent.59
Many minors wish to protect themselves from unwanted pregnancy, but they
will not discuss their sexual activities with their parents in order to do so.60
Accordingly, youth advocates emphasize that allowing sexually active teens
to obtain contraceptive services without parental involvement protects adolescent health and development.61 Those opposed to granting teenagers
greater autonomy in accessing contraception argue that giving a minor the
right to consent to contraceptive services without parents’ knowledge undermines parental authority and risks the minor’s healthy development.62
The debate on adolescent access to comprehensive sex education and
contraceptives seems unlikely to subside in the near future. In contrast, minors’ unobstructed access to “post-sexual activity” medical treatments, with
the exception of abortion, remains largely uncontroversial.

age teenagers to engage in sex. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the FDA could not mandate point-of-sale restrictions
on emergency contraception); Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544–45
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the FDA’s decision to limit minors’ access to Plan B
contraception was an abuse of discretion). In 2013, the FDA approved emergency
contraception for use without a prescription and without age restriction for all women
of child-bearing potential. See FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency Contraceptive for Use Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing Potential,
FDA
(June
20,
2013),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm358082.htm.
59. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, supra note
54, at 1.
60. Joshua A. Douglas, When is a “Minor” Also an “Adult”?: An Adolescent’s
Liberty Interest in Accessing Contraceptives from Public School Distribution Programs, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 545, 551 (2007).
61. Id. (footnotes omitted) (“Studies suggest that if a state requires prior parental
approval before a minor may obtain contraceptives from a distribution program, many
teenagers will forego availing themselves of this service. In one survey, 70% of teenagers said that if the law required parental notification, they would not visit a health
clinic at all, and 20% stated that they would continue to have sex but would either
rely on the withdrawal method or not use any contraceptives. Only 1% of those surveyed who currently use sexual health services said that they would stop having sex if
parental involvement was mandated before the adolescents received contraceptives.”).
See also Rachel K. Jones & Heather Boonstra, Confidential Reproductive Health
Services for Minors: The Potential Impact of Mandated Parental Involvement for
Contraception, 36 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 182, 189 (2004) (explaining that mandated parental involvement threatens the right of minors to access reproductive health care).
62. Jones & Boonstra, supra note 61, at 182; Anna Pikovsky Krishtul, Comment,
The FDA’s Recent About-Face: Plan B Age Restriction is Unlawful Rulemaking and
Violates Minors’ Due Process Rights, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 303, 325 (2008) (arguing to
the contrary that restricting minors’ access to contraception results in a higher degree
of harm to minor’s health).
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3. STI Treatment
All fifty states and the District of Columbia explicitly allow minors to
consent to treatment for STIs.63 A few states have special requirements if the
minor is HIV positive, and some states have age prerequisites for consent,
such as a minimum age of twelve.64 Aside from these requirements, however, legislators uniformly agree that the law should not mandate parental notice
or consent prior to a minor receiving STI services.65 Although some states
allow a physician to inform a minor’s parents that she is receiving STI treatment, no state mandates parental notification.66
The policy behind this rule is undisputed. Physicians and public health
advocates emphasize that hindering a minor’s consent to STI treatment can
increase the spread of STIs among adolescents, because minors are likely to
conceal the presence of STI symptoms from their parents for fear of a negative reaction.67 Accordingly, minors must be able to seek treatment on their
own in order to promote broader adolescent sexual health.68 Couched in the
language of public health, this exception to the general rule requiring parental
involvement with a minor’s treatment decisions has generated little to no
controversy.69

4. Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Medical Care for Minors’ Children
In sharp contrast to most states’ requirements of parental involvement in
abortion decisions, states overwhelmingly grant minors the right to independently make decisions related to their pregnancy and to their children’s
medical care if they choose to carry a pregnancy to term.70 Thirty-six states
and the District of Columbia explicitly allow minors to consent to prenatal
63. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to STI Services, supra note 41, at 2.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1–2. Eleven states have age prerequisites for consent. Id. Eight-

een states permit, but do not require, physicians to inform a minor’s parents that he or
she is seeking or obtaining STI services. Id. One state requires parental notification
in the case of a positive HIV test. Id. One state requires a physician to report a positive STI test result for a minor younger than twelve. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 48 (1994) [hereinafter Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women].
68. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 354–55.
69. Similarly, statutes permitting minors to consent to substance abuse treatment
are viewed not as an endorsement of minor capacity, but as an extension of the traditional rule that a doctor may treat a child without parental permission in medical
emergencies because the law presumes that parents would consent to protect their
child’s health. See Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women, supra note 67, at 48; infra
Part II (discussing treatment-based exceptions to parental consent).
70. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Access to Prenatal Care, supra note 42, at 2.
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care.71 Thirteen states have no explicit law on minors’ prenatal care, and
thus, minors commonly receive such care without parental involvement.72
North Dakota is the only state that requires parental consent prior to a minor
receiving prenatal care.73
The majority of states also respect a minor’s right as a parent to make
treatment decisions on behalf of her child.74 Thirty states and the District of
Columbia allow minors to consent to medical care for their children; the remaining twenty states have no explicit law on the matter.75
In sum, the vast majority of states have made the legislative policy decision that the health of a pregnant adolescent outweighs parents’ rights to be
involved in their adolescent’s important treatment decisions. Accordingly,
states permit minors to have autonomous access to care for pregnancy and
childbirth and even give them the power to make major decisions that may
arise during treatment, such as when and whether to consent to a C-section.76
Much like a minor’s access to STI treatment, some policymakers couch the
rationale for a minor’s unhindered access to prenatal care in the language of
public health.77 Less clear is the rationale for allowing minor parents to make
medical treatment decisions for their children, which is discussed further in
Part II.A.

5. Adoption
As with granting minor parents the right to consent to medical care for
their children, the majority of states treat minors like adults when it comes to
the decision to relinquish their child for adoption.78 Forty states and the District of Columbia allow minors to relinquish their infants for adoption, either
71. Id. at 2. Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia allow all minors to
consent to prenatal care. Id. Four states require the minor to be of a minimum age
before she can consent to care. Id. Four states allow a “mature minor” to consent to
prenatal care. Id.
72. Id. (Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). “In states that
lack relevant policy or case law, physicians may commonly provide medical care to a
mature minor without parental consent, particularly if the state allows minors to consent to related health services.” Id. at 1.
73. Id. at 2. North Dakota requires parental consent during prenatal visits in the
second and third trimesters; the minor may consent to prenatal care during the first
trimester and for the first visit after the first trimester. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 14-10-19 (West 2016).
74. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Rights as Parents, supra note 41, at 2.
75. Id.
76. Melissa Prober, Note, Please Don’t Tell My Parents: The Validity of School
Policies Mandating Parental Notification of a Student’s Pregnancy, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 557, 569–70 (2005).
77. See State Policies in Brief: Minors Access to Prenatal Care, supra note 42,
at 2.
78. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Rights as Parents, supra note 41, at 2.
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explicitly by statute or by making no distinction between minor parents and
adult parents.79 Five states require minors to be represented by legal counsel
in adoption hearings but have no requirement for involving the minor’s parents.80 Of the remaining five states, only four require parental consent to
adoption of their minor’s infant,81 and one state requires parental notification.82
As discussed previously, a minor’s autonomy with respect to sexuality
and reproductive decisions relates, at least to some degree, to public health
concerns. In sharp contrast, a minor’s freedom to give up her child for adoption without parental involvement is difficult to justify as a matter of public
health. This Article explores the likely motivations for the striking level of
autonomy granted to minors relinquishing an infant for adoption in Part II.B.

6. Abortion Exceptionalism
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Bellotti II, laws requiring parental involvement in minor abortion decisions have been constitutional, provided that the laws offer an alternative, such as judicial bypass.83 The Court’s
refusal to allow a parental veto and its requirement of an alternative to parental consent are both pivotal to understanding the Court’s balancing of the
interests at stake in parental involvement laws.84 Bellotti II’s reasoning
makes clear that the core justification for mandated parental involvement and
judicial bypass is to ensure better decision making for the minor.85 Although
the Court recognized parents’ rights to control their children’s upbringing and
to have a voice in abortion decisions, in balancing the various interests at
stake, the Court refused to place the parents’ rights above the minor’s reproductive rights – otherwise, allowing judicial bypass or other alternatives
would not make sense.86 Judges in bypass hearings may authorize a minor’s
abortion care after determining: (1) that the minor is sufficiently mature to
choose an abortion without involving a parent or, in the alternative, (2) that

79. Id.; Joan H. Hollinger, Consent to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.05 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 2013).
80. State Policies in Brief: Minors’ Rights as Parents, supra note 41, at 2 (Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Washington).
81. Id. (Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Rhode Island).
82. Id. (Pennsylvania).
83. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (plurality opinion).
84. See id. at 639–41.
85. Id. at 640–41.
86. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 238–
44 (2005) (arguing that the judicial bypass alternative undercut parental rights and
was meant to ensure minors’ access to abortion care).
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the abortion is in her best interests.87 As discussed further below in Part II.A,
studies analyzing the actual operation of parental involvement laws demonstrate the failure of judicial bypass to serve as a fair compromise that improves adolescent decision making.
As of March 1, 2012, thirty-eight states require parental involvement in
a minor’s decision to have an abortion or, in the alternative, provide for a
judicial bypass as constitutionally required.88 In addition, five states have
parental involvement laws that are not in effect due to court enjoinment.89
That leaves only seven states and the District of Columbia, which have no
parental involvement laws, actual or attempted.90 The popularity of legislation mandating parental involvement with abortion is quite striking, especially in contrast to the autonomy that almost all states grant to minors who
choose to carry a pregnancy to term.
When analyzed in conjunction with statutory rape laws granting teenagers the right to consent to sex – typically at age sixteen – many states “grant
minor females the right to privately and independently consent to intercourse
and even motherhood, but not the corresponding right to obtain an abortion
without parental involvement.”91

***
Situating abortion within these decisions relating to sexuality and reproduction, a minor’s right to access abortion in most states remains subject to
either parental or state authority. In states with parental involvement laws,
minors do not possess fully unfettered decision-making authority over abortion, as with treatment for STIs or pregnancy and childrearing. And yet, parents also do not possess a complete veto power over their teenagers’ abortion
87. See generally Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 35 (describing judicial determinations of “maturity” and “best interests” in Michigan and in comparison with
other states).
88. State Policies in Brief: Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions,
GUTTMACHER
INST.
1
(Jan.
1,
2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf. Most states require
consent or notification of only one parent, usually twenty-four or forty-eight hours
before the procedure. Id. All thirty-eight states with parental involvement laws allow
for judicial bypass as constitutionally required. Id. Thirty-three states permit a minor
to obtain an abortion without parental involvement in a medical emergency. Id. Sixteen states permit a minor to obtain an abortion without parental involvement in cases
of abuse, assault, incest or neglect. Id. Twenty-one states require parental consent
only, three of which require both parents to consent. Id. Twelve states require parental notification only, one of which requires that both parents be notified. Id. Five
states require both parental consent and notification. Id.
89. Id. (California, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, and New Mexico).
90. Id. at 2 (Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington).
91. Nicole Phillis, When Sixteen Ain’t So Sweet: Rethinking the Regulation of
Adolescent Sexuality, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 271, 283 (2011).
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decisions as they may be able to with regard to sex education in many jurisdictions. The judicial bypass requirement for abortion gives minors an escape route from their parents, but as many commentators have noted, this is a
very problematic and hazardous route.92 The question remains: Why grant
minors full authority over their pregnancy and parenting decisions while
denying them similar authority to avoid parenthood?93 The next Part seeks to
explain these doctrinal inconsistencies.

II. MINORS, PARENTS, AND MINORS AS PARENTS
This Part seeks to better understand the law’s approach to minors’ sexual and reproductive rights, both in theory and in practice. This Part looks to
family law doctrines and practices to make sense of the law’s unusual grant
of adult-like rights to minor parents on the face of the law and to expose the
reality that the law often tramples upon minor parents’ parental rights in practice.
In Part II.A, this Article applies longstanding conventions on parental
rights to help explain the conflicts in the law governing teenagers’ sexual and
reproductive autonomy. This Article shows that traditional conceptions of
parental control continue to exert a strong influence, even in areas of the law
that appear to expand adolescent autonomy. For example, the rule that adolescents can freely consent to STI treatment represents an extension of the
traditional exemption from parental control for medical emergencies rather
than a recognition of a right to sexual autonomy for adolescents. Similarly,
this Part argues that the law grants minor parents full parental autonomy, at
least in theory, because of a reflexive desire to assert the rights of persons
categorized as parents – not out of respect for a minor’s right to parent her
child as she sees fit. In other words, the law resists explicitly limiting parental rights, even for minor parents, out of fear that it would risk adults’ parental rights.
Part II.B argues that, in practice, the rigid notions about parental rights
that influence the law on adolescent reproduction do not lead to substantive
92. See infra Part II.A.
93. This disparity is particularly striking given that pregnancy and childbirth

pose much more significant health risks than abortion. See Loren M. Dobkin et al.,
Pregnancy Options Counseling for Adolescents: Overcoming Barriers to Care and
Preserving Preference, 43 CURRENT PROBS. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE
96, 98 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (“Studies have consistently shown that there is a
greater risk of a serious physical complication from childbirth than from abortion,
with the risk of mortality on average 14 times greater for continuing a pregnancy to
birth. Although this ratio has not been specifically calculated for adolescents, the risk
of complications from abortion remains low at younger ages, including less than 20
years old.”); J. Thomas, Teenagers and Young Adults Have Elevated MaternityRelated Risks, 44 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 207, 207 (2012) (concluding
that teenagers are at “heightened risk of adverse outcomes” during maternity as compared with adults).
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protection of minor parents’ parental rights. The law on adolescent reproduction appears inconsistent in its surface treatment of abortion versus childbirth,
but a deeper analysis exposes commonalities scholars have overlooked. Although the law grants parental rights to minor parents in theory, a closer examination of areas of family law that deal directly with minors as parents –
namely, child welfare law and adoption law – reveals a similarly skeptical
view of adolescent reproductive decision making and a desire to punish female teenage sexual transgression of purity norms, whether pregnant teenage
girls choose abortion or childbirth. Even though the child welfare system
also subjects adult parents from marginalized populations to high levels of
scrutiny and disrespect of their parental rights, minor parents from marginalized families remain doubly vulnerable to state action stripping their parental
rights.94 Poor and racial minority minor parents particularly suffer under
child welfare practices, but even teenage parents from less marginalized
groups face risks to their parental rights under past and present adoption law
practices.95 Ultimately, this Part demonstrates that the superficially conflicting rules on adolescent abortion and childbirth work in tandem to enforce the
traditional gender script of maternal self-sacrifice – women, and girls, should
give birth and seek redemption for their sexual transgressions by giving up
their children to better circumstances, no matter the emotional costs to themselves.96

A. Minor Parents’ Parental Rights in Theory
One obvious explanation for this core contradiction – the law’s privileging of minors who choose to carry a pregnancy to term with decisional
autonomy and punishing of minors who choose abortion by subjecting their
decisions to parental or judicial authority – is that these laws reflect an antiabortion agenda.97 I agree with critics that a large part of the motivation for
mandating parental involvement with abortion arises from anti-abortion advocacy.98 Certainly, there are legislators and advocates of parental involve94. See Maya Manian, Functional Parenting and Dysfunctional Abortion Policy:
Reforming Parental Involvement Legislation, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 241, 250 (2012).
95. See Appleton, supra note 11, at 281 & n.144.
96. See, e.g., id. at 323–25 (discussing gender scripts related to motherhood and
pregnancy).
97. See Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 569.
98. As other scholars have demonstrated, inconsistencies in the law’s treatment
of minors based on pregnancy outcome unmask a pro-natalist agenda underlying
parental involvement laws. See, e.g., J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality
of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving
Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 149 (2003). Gender stereotypes also
influence the disparate treatment of teenage girls who choose childbirth over abortion.
See Phillis, supra note 91, at 292 (“[I]f a minor female elects to carry a pregnancy to
term she is fulfilling her natural role of ‘woman as child bearer’ and she is rewarded
with adult, decision-making abilities. Yet if a minor female seeks to terminate her
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ment laws who are motivated by their anti-abortion stance, seeking to throw
any obstacles in the way of girls’ and women’s access to abortion.99
Taking the Supreme Court’s justification for mandated parental involvement at face value, these laws should be improving adolescent decision
making and thereby, presumably, improving the outcomes of health and wellbeing for pregnant teenagers. Yet, decades of studies on the efficacy of parental involvement legislation demonstrate that these laws harm more than
help adolescent girls.100 Public health research on the impact of parental involvement legislation on teenagers indicates that these laws do not improve
parent-child communication, protect teenagers’ health, or reduce the number
of abortions.101 “Instead, evidence suggests that mandated parental involvement with abortion is unnecessary in many cases and harmful in others.”102
pregnancy, she is refusing the stereotype of ‘woman as child bearer’ and consequently, presumed so immature as to require either parental or judicial approval of her
decision.”). See also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality
Analysis of “Woman-Protective” Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991,
991–94 (2007) (discussing gender stereotypes animating legislation restricting access
to abortion). The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart has further fueled
gender stereotyped reasoning in the abortion context, particularly with its admittedly
unsubstantiated claim that women regret their abortions. See 550 U.S. 124, 159
(2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant
life they once created and sustained.”); see also Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 223 (2009) (arguing that the “abortion regret” rationale in support of abortion
restrictions reflects gender stereotypes, particularly as compared to the standard approach to informed consent); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional
Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J.
1641, 1688 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, The Right’s Reasons] (discussing Carhart’s
reliance on claim of abortion “regret” to justify restrictions on abortion).
99. See Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics
and Policy, 18 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 305, 311–15 (2004) [hereinafter Sanger,
Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States] (arguing that the prime motivation
behind parental involvement laws is to prevent access to abortion and punish those
girls who seek it); Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity, Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409 (2009) [hereinafter
Sanger, Decisional Dignity]. Advocates of parental involvement mandates often raise
the specter of regret in the context of teenage abortion, although recent studies have
thoroughly examined and debunked the notion of post-abortion trauma for both adult
women and adolescents. See Trine Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disorder, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332 (2011); see also Brenda
Major et al., Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N
(2008), http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf.
100. See Manian, supra note 94, at 244–46.
101. See id.
102. See id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620,
637–38 (N.J. 2000) (summarizing data on impact of the parental involvement mandates).
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Studies also confirm what should be no surprise: that the judicial bypass hearings cause significant psychological distress.103 Teenage girls who do not
discuss their pregnancies with their parents often have weighty fears about
forced disclosure, including fears of being kicked out of their family homes
or fears of abuse.104 These teenagers’ only other option is equally distressing
because, to prove their maturity to a judge, they must discuss the most intimate details of their lives to a complete stranger in a courtroom environment
that would intimidate most adults.105
Scholars who have extensively analyzed the bypass process conclude
that the judicial hearings operate primarily as a means to shame teenage girls
for their transgression of gendered sexual purity norms.106 Judges interrogate
girls about the most intimate aspects of their lives, in some cases asking inappropriate and irrelevant questions, such as demanding to know where and
how often the individual had sex.107 Professor Carol Sanger argues that the
harms that flow from judicial bypass include not only the risk of medical
harm due to delay, but also the dignitary harms that arise from the humiliation inflicted by the bypass hearing itself.108 Parental involvement laws also
most heavily punish the most vulnerable and marginalized minors – those
who lack supportive parents, parental surrogates, or the resources to readily
access the court system.109 Professor Sanger succinctly summarizes the opinion of many critics of parental involvement mandates:

103. Ehrlich, supra note 98, at 173–74.
104. Those minors who choose not to notify a parent fear “family conflict, physi-

cal harm, or other abuse if they told a parent about the pregnancy.” Robert D. Webster et al., Editorial, Parental Involvement Laws and Parent-Daughter Communication: Policy Without Proof, 82 CONTRACEPTION 310, 311 (2010). One study specifically demonstrated that mandated communication could be physically harmful to
some minors, reporting higher rates of physical violence or being beaten in cases
where parents became aware of the pregnancy without the minors’ consent. See id.
In general, the literature suggests “that forced parent-daughter communication around
abortion could be harmful or perceived as harmful for some youth.” Id.
105. See Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, supra note
99, at 311–12.
106. See Jamin B. Raskin, The Paradox of Judicial Bypass Proceedings, 10 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 281, 284 (2002) (stating “that these searching voyeuristic hearings function primarily to . . . humiliate and to shame the young woman”);
see also Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, supra note 99, at
314 (“Understanding the hearings as a means of imposing control over teenage sex
and abortion helps explain why bypass statutes are so popular among legislatures
despite the fact that so few petitions are denied.”).
107. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BYPASSING JUSTICE: PREGNANT
MINORS AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT LAWS 28 (on file with author); see generally
HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS
(2007).
108. See Sanger, Decisional Dignity, supra note 99, at 444–79.
109. See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 107, at 58.
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[P]arental involvement statutes, while often couched in the language
of family togetherness and child protection, are less concerned with
developing sound or nuanced family policies in the area of adolescent
reproduction than with securing a set of political goals aimed at
thwarting access to abortion, restoring parental authority, and punishing girls for having sex.110

In short, the law on adolescent abortion expresses a skeptical view of
adolescent reproductive decision making and an intent to punish female teenage sexual expression. In comparison, the law’s puzzling approach to the
adolescent who chooses to become a parent reflects an odd blind spot.
Scholars have noted that it is the law’s approach to minors’ parental rights –
not abortion law – that is “out of step” with other areas of youth law, which
generally restricts the rights of minors.111
This Article argues that the apparent expansion of adolescent rights with
regard to the right to parent merely represents an application of long-standing
rules benefitting adults rather than growing recognition of adolescents’ autonomy interests. I argue that a family law perspective – in particular a focus
on traditional rules related to parental rights – helps to explain the law’s unusual approach to teenage childbirth and childrearing. Other than sentiments
against abortion, deeply rooted notions about parental rights provide an additional angle for understanding the law’s conflicting approaches to minor’s
autonomy in sexual and reproductive decision making. In particular, this
Article shows that conventional categories long recognized in the law for
exempting children from parental authority illuminate the law’s contradictory
approaches to teenage sexuality and reproduction.
As discussed in Part I, constitutional law recognizes and reinforces
deeply felt conceptions of parental rights, including parents’ rights to control
decision making for their children. However, state common law and statutory
law have long recognized exemptions from parental authority that fall into
two broad categories: (1) medical emergencies and (2) special status-based
exceptions.112 The areas in which adolescents have been given greater autonomy over their sexual and reproductive decisions fall into one of these two
long-standing exceptional categories in the public’s eyes, while the others
arguably do not.113 In other words, apparent advancements in the law on
adolescents’ sexual and reproductive autonomy actually map onto the traditional scope of parental control.
The first category – exemption from parental consent for medical emergencies – reflects common sense. Because society wants to ensure that mi110. Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, supra note 99, at

306.
111. Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 785, 786
(2000) [hereinafter Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors].
112. See Hill, supra note 27, at 41–43. See also Mutcherson, supra note 27, at
267.
113. See Hill, supra note 27, at 42–43.
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nors receive needed treatment, the law has always assumed that parents
would consent in cases of a minor’s urgent health needs. Generally speaking,
minors are categorically incapable of giving informed consent to medical
treatment.114 However, even under the conventional rule requiring parental
permission prior to medical treatment of a minor, physicians have long been
given the authority to treat minors without first obtaining parental consent in
114. See J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability and the Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 78–
80 (2003) (discussing binary classification of child/parent; no separate legal status of
adolescence); Rhonda G. Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1306–22 (2000) (minors cannot consent to most
medical procedures or execute advanced directives); Scott, The Legal Construction of
Adolescence, supra note 1, at 566. Parents generally possess the authority to decide
when a child will receive medical treatment. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979) (upholding a law permitting the voluntary commitment of a child by parents to
a state mental hospital if the physician agrees). In addition to the exceptions to this
rule for medical emergencies and status-based exceptions, the mature minor doctrine
allows minors to seek medical care from a judge, who determines a minor’s maturity
on a case-by-case basis. See Hill, supra note 27, at 42–49 (“The mature-minor rule . .
. generally calls for a case-by-case assessment of an individual minor’s circumstances.”); Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 268; Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and
Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127, 127 (1996) [hereinafter Oberman, Minor Rights
and Wrongs] (discussing mature minor doctrine). Michelle Oberman has argued that
maturity in the healthcare context “operates as a code word, invoked to permit minors
access to treatments that society deems desirable, and to limit their access to treatments that carry the possibility of long-term negative consequences.” Id. Discussing
the mature minor case law involving a minor’s assertion of the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, Oberman argues that court decisions ultimately rested “on
subjective judicial assessments of the patients’ maturity” and that “the courts are
remarkably ill equipped to make such determinations” of maturity. Id. at 128. Other
scholars have reached similar conclusions with regard to case-by-case judicial assessments of maturity in the criminal context. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 836–37 (2003) (stating that determining maturity of young offenders in individual cases “is likely to be an error-prone
undertaking, with the outcomes determined by factors other than immaturity”). Extensive analysis of judicial bypass hearings in the abortion context also reveals the
arbitrariness of case-by-case judicial determinations of adolescent capacity for decision-making. See Manian, supra note 94, at 244–46 (summarizing literature criticizing judicial bypass hearings). Elizabeth Scott argues that the judicial bypass system
in abortion law is a means of recognizing adolescence as a unique stage between
childhood and adulthood, but one that is a “costly regulatory scheme [that] offers little
in the way of social benefit.” Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra
note 1, at 569, 574–76 (critiquing judicial bypass process in abortion context). See
also Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 413–14 (1997) (noting that in the abortion context teenage girls “have been granted a peculiar sort of burdened autonomy
that substitutes state authority for parental authority, and that asks pregnant girls to
show far more initiative and competence than the Court has asked of adult women
seeking abortions”).
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cases of medical emergencies.115 Under the medical emergency exception,
“the guardian’s consent to emergency care was implied, on the theory that
any delay incurred in attempting to secure consent would jeopardize the minor’s health.”116 The exemption for medical emergencies has, over time,
become more broadly understood to include the unique medical needs of adolescents and a common list of treatment-based exemptions, such as treatment
for drug dependency, mental health issues, and sexuality-related problems.117
Scholars generally agree that the treatment-based exemptions to parental consent are an extension of the traditional exemption for medical emergencies,
both of which are based on the desire to ensure that children receive needed
medical care, rather than support for adolescent autonomy interests.118
We can map the modern rules granting adolescents greater autonomy in
access to sexual and reproductive healthcare onto the traditional medical
“emergency” exemption. For example, the universal rule across the fifty
states that minors may independently consent to STI treatment falls within
this first categorical exception to parental rights for children’s urgent health
needs.119 The exception to parental consent for prenatal care similarly appears to be grounded not on the belief that teenagers make particularly sound
decisions in these matters, but rather on the understanding that adolescents
are more likely to make the choice to seek treatment – the choice that legislators and parents view as best – if not required to reveal their need for treatment to their parents.120 Couched in the neutral language of public health,
115. Hill, supra note 27, at 41 (“[M]edical emergencies require no consent; indeed, this is true for adults as well as children.”).
116. Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130.
117. See Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 256–72.
118. See id. (noting that treatment-based exceptions were based on public health
goals and concern about larger societal costs rather than notions of adolescent capacity or rights); Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130–31; Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women, supra note 67, at 47 (“[A] close examination of the
line of cases which govern minors’ rights to consent to treatment . . . reveals that the
changes in these rights have been driven not by a sense that minors are mature enough
to make such decisions, but rather, by a belief that certain forms of treatment are so
important that the law should facilitate access to them.”); MAXINE EICHNER, THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 129
(2010) (noting that laws granting minors treatment-based exceptions to parental consent for birth control, STIs, drug abuse, and mental health issues exist “not because
minors have especially mature judgment in these areas; instead . . . the threat to children’s long-term welfare tips the scales in favor of allowing them decision making
power”); Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1617 (1992) [hereinafter Scott, Judgment and Reasoning]
(“The policies dealing with medical decisionmaking [sic] also fit within a paternalistic framework. . . . There is little evidence that policymakers are moved by concern
for minors’ autonomy interest in making decisions about sexual activity.”).
119. See Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130.
120. See Wadlington, supra note 10, at 323–24 (noting that state laws granting
minors autonomy for specific types of medical treatment, such as drug abuse and
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rather than in the language of advocacy for adolescent sexual autonomy, these
parental consent exemptions granted to minors have generated little to no
controversy.121
In comparison, where the public finds the urgency of the minor’s health
needs to be debatable, controversy continues over whether to deviate from the
norm of deference to parents’ right to authority over their children.122 For
example, with regard to sex education and contraceptive services, the public
still vehemently debates whether more or less access will harm children’s
health and development.123 Those jurisdictions that take the view that diminished access to contraception will better promote adolescent development,
STIs, are not based on a state’s interest in affording children greater autonomy but
rather in ensuring that minors obtain important medical treatment they would otherwise delay or avoid if parental involvement were required); see also Oberman, Minor
Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130 (“[T]he purposes underlying laws that
treat minors like adults have almost nothing to do with the perceived maturity of the
adolescent population. A critical evaluation of the mature minor doctrine reveals that
these laws, like those before them, grow out of the traditional impulse to protect this
population.”); Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1618–19 (“[T]he
law cares about the quality of adolescent judgment and . . . policies extending the
freedom to make choices are limited by paternalistic goals. . . . [T]he medical consent
statutes, while they appear to endorse greater adolescent autonomy, are equally consistent with a response directed toward promoting adolescent welfare and reducing
social cost.”).
121. Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 269–71 (noting that treatment-based exceptions were based on public health goals rather than notions of adolescent capacity or
rights); Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130 (“This public
health concern [regarding spread of disease], coupled with a fear that teens would not
seek treatment for these communicable conditions if their parents had to be notified
of—let alone give consent for—such treatment, led states to pass ‘minor treatment
statutes.’”).
122. Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 131 (“Minor treatment statutes reflect a public consensus that ensuring minors’ access to the given
treatment outweighs parental interests in controlling the care a child receives. The
focus of such exceptions rests not on an assessment of maturity, but on a calculus that
grants minors autonomy only when the treatment is relatively low risk, and when
denying access may cause the minor (or the public at large) to suffer permanent
harm.”).
123. Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 791–92 (noting that
legislation battling teenage pregnancy and other problems related to teenage sexuality
takes conflicting approaches).
Laws provide for contraceptive counseling and services . . . and for sexual education, all on the theory that, if teenagers are having sex, information and
contraceptives will reduce the bad consequences of their sexual activity. Other laws restrict minors’ access to contraceptives and require the affirmative
promotion of abstinence, on the theory that this approach will alter adolescent
attitudes and diminish the prevalence of adolescent sex.

Id.
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perhaps because they believe that access to contraception encourages sexual
activity, emphasize the conventional family law exceptions to parental authority; as a result, they explicitly grant minors independent access to prescription contraceptive services where the minor demonstrates an urgent
health need.124 With regard to abortion, it appears that members of the public
in many states, including those that otherwise lean in favor of abortion rights,
find the health risks of delayed access to abortion care to be a debatable proposition, despite clear medical evidence of the harms of such delays.125
In sum, applying the law’s traditional medical emergency exemption to
the parental right of control over minors holds explanatory power for the variety of contradictory approaches that states take to granting minors autonomy in their sexual and reproductive healthcare decision making.126 What this
124. For example, as discussed above, although about half the states explicitly by
law allow minors to freely consent to prescription contraceptives, the remaining states
follow a more traditional approach, explicitly by statute granting minors’ an exemption from parental authority when they meet certain status based requirements (discussed further infra) or need unfettered access to protect their health. See supra Part
I.C.2. Twenty-five states explicitly permit minors to consent to prescription contraceptive services if they are or have been pregnant, parenting or married, or have a
medical need. See supra Part I.C.2. In those states with expanded access to prescription contraceptives, the push for expanded access to contraceptive services for minors
“was cast not in terms of the minor’s actual maturity, but instead, as a response to a
public health threat—the increase in teen sex, and the consequent risks of venereal
diseases, pregnancies, and illegitimate births.” Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women,
supra note 67, at 49.
125. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 107, 1–4; Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs,
supra note 114, at 131 (“The cumbersome route to permitting adolescents to consent
to abortion reflects the politically divisive nature of the abortion debate, and the fact
that, unlike contraception, there is less public consensus about whether it is in a minor’s best interest to procure an abortion. This debate is not about adolescent capacity—it is about parental rights to control their children.”). There is clear medical evidence on the harms of such delays. See Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States, 103 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 729, 731 (2004) (“[T]here is a 38% increase in risk of death for each
additional week of gestation. . . . [T]he increase in the risk of death due to delaying
the procedure by 1 week is much higher at later gestational ages than at earlier gestational ages.”); see also Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies, and Facial Challenges, 36
HAST. CONST. L.Q. 611, 621 (2009). Courts that have struck down parental involvement mandates have done so primarily on the ground that such laws harm teenage
girls’ health. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000).
See Rebouché, supra note 5, at 208 (discussing the 2008 defeat of the California
Proposition 4 parental involvement law, where health arguments against the law succeeded).
126. Elizabeth Scott also demonstrates that “policies that appear to signal an erosion of the paternalistic legal framework in fact fit quite comfortably within it.”
Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1612. Professor Scott further
argues:
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Article previously referred to as “pre-sexual activity” decisions about sex
education and contraceptives may fall under a more broadly understood medical “emergency” exception to parental control, but controversy continues to
rage on these issues depending on the view of which approach better protects
adolescent health. The need for minors’ autonomy in “post-sexual activity”
decisions relating to STI treatment and pregnancy services seems clearly
grounded in the view that parental consent must be rejected out of medical
necessity, a view that has not taken widespread hold with regard to abortion.
Of course, politics surrounding teenage sexuality and abortion also influence
the law here.127 The key point is that where minors’ rights to independently
access healthcare related to sexuality and reproduction have been expanded,
this expansion of rights tends to be motivated by the traditional exemption
from parental control for medical emergencies and public health needs, rather
than by a concern for minors’ autonomy interests in decision making surrounding sex and reproduction.128
Turning to the second traditional exemption to parental authority for
minors who fall into special statuses helps to explain the law’s conflicting
approach to teenage childbirth versus abortion and, in particular, the law’s
unusual grant of authority to minor parents. State law has long recognized
status-based exceptions to parental authority for minors who are in some form
“emancipated.”129 Freedom from parental control can occur either by a formal emancipation process130 or automatically by entering into certain status-

[E]ven advocates of expanded rights for adolescents are generally instrumentalist in their approach to autonomy and are ultimately driven by paternalistic
goals. At the heart of this paternalism is a commonly shared intuition that minors have poorer judgment than adults and that they are more likely than adults
to make choices that are threatening to their health and well-being.

Id.
127. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 86, at 23–40 (the law granting minors fairly
liberal abortion rights is motivated by concerns about the public health problem, and
not by concerns about minor’s rights); Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After
Roper v. Simmons: “Kids are Just Different” and “Kids are Like Adults” Advocacy
Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS 273, 291 (2008) (discussing a child
advocate’s moral, political, philosophical, and religious views as related to minor
autonomy rights); Wadlington, supra note 10, at 324 (“These are situations where
legislatures feared that minors would be unwilling to seek assistance or consent from
their parents. If minors could not personally consent to treatment, they might not
obtain medical care -- to the detriment of themselves, their families, and society.”).
128. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1617.
129. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating
Children in Minor Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 262 (1992).
130. Minors who obtain the legal status of emancipation are treated as adults in
most of their dealings with parents and third parties. See id. (discussing processes and
consequences of emancipation and arguing that emancipation does not always serve
stated end of benefitting mature minors). Thus, emancipated minors can freely consent to medical treatment – and otherwise ignore their parents’ commands – while
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es.131 In particular, these statuses include marriage, military service, and, to a
lesser extent, becoming a parent.132
The rationale for this second category of status-based exemptions to parental authority is less clear than the medical emergency category. Some
argue that minors who are married or in the military are exempted from parental authority for reasons of administrative expediency.133 The status-based
exceptions perhaps also reflect underlying notions traditional in family law of
the child as the “property” of her parents or, traditionally, of her father.134 In
other words, only one person should be in charge of a minor, and marriage or
military service transfers power to a new authority. This notion of child as
property of her parents may further explicate the differential treatment of
pregnant minors who choose childbirth rather than abortion. Although minor
parents are not automatically “emancipated” from their own parents’ authority in most jurisdictions, they still possess full parental authority over their
infants in all states, at least in theory.135 Once the minor takes on the mantle
conversely parents owe no duty of support to their emancipated minors. See id. A
parent or minor can seek formal legal emancipation in court on a case-by-case basis,
which typically requires that the minor demonstrate that she has established a separate
domicile and financial independence. See id. at 245–46. See also Oberman, Minor
Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130 (“The definition of emancipation varies
from state to state, but it is generally limited to minors who are not living at home,
who are not economically dependent on their parents, and whose parents have surrendered parental duties. In the past, this category consisted primarily of married minors
and minors in the military service.”); Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 266–67 (explaining the processes for emancipation, either by court order or automatically by statuses
such as marriage, military service, or parenthood).
131. See Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 267.
132. Both statutes and case law in most states declare that minors who marry or
enlist in the military may be free from parental authority and obligation. See HOMER
H. CLARK, Jr., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 326 (2d ed.
1988); Jennifer L. Rosato, Let’s Get Real: Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 770–
79 (2002) (discussing the general rule that minors cannot consent to medical treatment unless they qualify for the narrow treatment-based exceptions or qualify for
traditional status-based exceptions, such as minors who are in the military, married,
pregnant, or parenting).
133. See Hill, supra note 27, at 41–43 (discussing classes of minors deemed “sufficiently adult-like to consent to care as if they were adults,” including minors who
are married or in the military); Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 129, at 258 (stating
that statutory emancipation for minors who are married and enlisted in the military
rests on the premise that the new social status is inconsistent with parental control).
134. Stuart N. Hart, From Property to Person Status: Historical Perspective on
Children’s Rights, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53 (1991) (discussing transition of children
from property to personhood); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING
POVERTY 313, 313 (1998).
135. “In some jurisdictions, becoming a parent results in emancipation; in most it
does not.” Barbara Glesner Fines, Challenges of Representing Adolescent Parents in
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of parenthood herself, she obtains the full rights of parenthood over her child
as her parents have over her – she achieves the status of parent.
On the surface, family law takes a seemingly categorical approach to
parenthood. The law generally categorizes persons as either “parents” or
“children”; the law does not explicitly recognize an in-between status for
minor parents. Thus, a minor who seeks to terminate her pregnancy chooses
to remain in the “child” category: her role vis-a-vis her parents remains unchanged. In contrast, a minor who gives birth falls into both categories. She
is a child and a parent at the same time – still a child in her parents’ eyes yet
now also a parent herself. 136
The law seems unable, or perhaps unwilling, to grasp how to explicitly
recognize both roles in the same person, at the same moment. Superficially,
the law takes an indivisible approach to minor parenthood by granting the
minor parent the full panoply of parental rights and duties, although it need
not do so.137 At least on its face, the law treats a minor who decides to carry
her pregnancy to term as possessing all of the attendant rights and obligations
of parenthood and relegates the minor’s parents to the role of grandparents
with correspondingly limited rights.138 According to conventional rules of
family law, parents uniquely possess the fundamental right to make decisions
for their children. Thus, to the extent that the minor is acting as a parent toward her own child, it follows from the familiar doctrines of family law that
the minor should be allowed to make autonomous decisions relating to her
infant, including making medical treatment decisions or relinquishing the
infant for adoption.139 From this parental rights perspective, it is logical to
both deny autonomy to a minor who chooses abortion while at the same time
granting a minor parent autonomy over her pregnancy and child, despite the
possibility that in both cases, the minor may be equally immature. As discussed previously, none of these exceptions to parental authority – treatmentbased or status-based – are in fact grounded on a notion of minor maturity or
capacity for sound decision making.

Child Welfare Proceedings, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 307, 324–25 (2011); see also
Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 830.
136. These rules on minor parenthood apply to minor fathers as well; however,
my focus is on teenage girls since teenage parents rarely marry, and the father’s involvement is often minimal. See Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note
111, at 787–88.
137. See id. at 793–94 (arguing that granting minor parents the full panoply of
parental rights is not constitutionally mandated since “rights afforded the highest level
of constitutional protection for adults are circumscribed for all minors, based on their
age alone”).
138. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
139. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he fact of having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for
parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for
the termination of the legal disabilities of minority.”).
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The fact of pregnancy and motherhood does not make a teenager more
mature, but the law has treated status-based grants of autonomy as grounds
for independence based on “ease of application and a need for consistency,
rather than a recognition of the minor’s [capacity for] autonomy.”140 To be
clear, I am not arguing that family law dictates the law’s inconsistent treatment of minors who choose childbirth versus abortion. In fact, modern family law parses out parental authority in much more nuanced ways.141 Precedents on the scope of children’s rights indicate that states could constitutionally limit the rights of minor parents for the same three reasons that states
may limit minors’ access to abortion: (1) the minors’ vulnerability, (2) the
minors’ immaturity and resulting limited decision-making capacity, and (3)
the parents’ important role in controlling their minor child’s upbringing.142
Poor decision making in the context of minor parenting may lead to life-long
detrimental impacts for the minor parent, for the minor’s parents, and for the
minor’s child, which could provide sufficient constitutional justification for
constraints on a minor’s parenting decisions as on decisions to terminate a
pregnancy.143 Arguably, the law should grant adult parents more control over
140. Rosato, supra note 132, at 777; see also Belotti II, 443 U.S. at 643 n.23
(“[T]he problem of determining ‘maturity’ makes clear why the State generally may
resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such as age limits, marital
status, or membership in the Armed Forces for lifting some or all of the legal disabilities of minority.”). For example, married minors are typically treated as emancipated
even though many married minors continue to live with relatives and to receive financial assistance from their parents. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 129, at 304
n.263.
141. See infra Part III.B.
142. See Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 797–822 (arguing that rationales for restricting minors’ access to abortion and other constitutional
rights justify similar restrictions on minors’ parental rights); see also Bellotti II, 443
U.S. at 633–34 (plurality opinion).
143. Obviously there are vastly differing opinions on the moral significance of the
decision to abort versus carrying a pregnancy to term. Even those opposed to abortion, however, would likely concede that the decision to become a teenage parent has
a dramatic effect on the course of a teenager’s life. Professor Emily Buss argues that,
particularly given the potential long-term negative consequences of teenage motherhood for all three generations, it is striking that “where immature decision making
produces a teenage mother, the law applies no protective brakes.” Buss, The Parental
Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 793 (discussing negative consequences of teenage parenthood to parents of the minor, the minor parent herself and her child). Professor Buss suggests a more nuanced approach that would recognize that the minor
parent’s parents still have parental rights that could temper an adolescent’s own parental rights, such as by requiring shared custodial decision making between the minor parent and her parents. See id. at 806 (noting that when “minor and parent are
collapsed into one individual,” there may be “two individuals hav[ing] potentially
dueling parental claims,” namely the minor parent versus her parents). She also argues that states could constitutionally limit the scope of minor parents’ rights in ways
similar to minors’ abortion rights or through other alternatives, such as shared custody
with the minor’s parents until the minor parent comes of age. See id. at 817–18.
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their teenagers by granting the adult parents greater rights over the teenage
parent’s infant and by explicitly crafting an in-between limited parental rights
status for minor parents. Yet, in theory, the law protects minor parents’ parental rights as strongly as it protects the rights of parents of minors seeking
abortion. This contradiction appears to be rooted in family law’s deeply held
notions about parental rights, a notion that holds even when the parent is a
minor.144 My point is not that these rules are sensible or normatively appropriate. Nor am I claiming that anti-abortion sentiment has nothing to do with
the popularity of parental involvement laws or that parental involvement with
abortion is the correct policy approach.145 Rather, this analysis demonstrates
that the existing, conflicting rules governing adolescent pregnancy and parenting map directly onto the law’s traditional, formal protection of adults’
parental rights.146
As Elizabeth Scott has demonstrated, progress in the context of adolescent “rights” is an illusion, since “many of the reforms that expand adolescent
self-determination are wholly consistent with traditional goals of promoting
children’s welfare, furthering social welfare and preserving parental authori-

144. Professor Buss argues that “there is something about parental rights that
makes them uniquely resistant to . . . regulation.” Id. at 811. She notes that the notion of parental control runs so deep that no law in any of the fifty states “qualifies
minors’ legal rights to control the upbringing of their children, even if they give birth
at the age of eleven.” Id. at 792 (discussing the negative consequences of teenage
parenthood to parents of the minor, the minor parent herself and her child).
Contrast the volume and variety of these approaches [to contraception and
abortion] with the absolute lack of any legislation aimed at mitigating the
three-generational harm imposed if and when the minor decides to keep the
baby and take on parental responsibilities. In no state does the law require the
minor to consult with her parents, let alone to obtain parental consent, before
acting on these decisions.

Id.; see PATRICIA DONOVAN, OUR DAUGHTERS’ DECISIONS: THE CONFLICT IN STATE
LAW ON ABORTION AND OTHER ISSUES 17 (1992) (“[N]o state requires a minor to
have parental consent to continue a pregnancy to term. Once a teenager has borne a
child, she can decide whether to raise the child herself or put it up for adoption.”).
145. See Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States, supra note
99, at 313. Professor Sanger also notes that parental involvement with abortion reasserts parental control over teenage sexuality, a control that was lost with changes in
the law on juvenile delinquency. Id.
146. It is important to note that although in theory the law strongly protects parents’ fundamental right to control their children’s upbringing, poor and racial minority parents of all ages have long been subjected to state scrutiny and weakened parental rights within the child welfare system in particular and in “public” family law in
general. See generally Jill E. Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV.
825 (2004) (discussing welfare law as public family law). See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing child welfare).
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ty.”147 Just as the “expansion” of adolescents’ self-determination in the context of sensitive medical treatment actually serves traditional paternalistic and
instrumentalist objectives – that adolescents should receive the medical care
that adults would like them to have – so too do the expansive parental rights
of minor parents perhaps merely reflect the law’s reflexive reaffirmation of
parental authority to protect those who typically achieve the status of parent:
adults. The law resists any overt reduction of parental rights, even for minors, because this reduction could pose a threat to the authority and certainty
of the traditional model of parental rights. In other words, the law’s grant of
parental rights to minor parents serves to protect the interests of adults, as in
so many other areas of supposed advancements for children’s “rights.”148
The autonomy granted to minor parents – unusual in the context of a
body of youth law that generally denies minors any adult-like rights – appears
to be a superficial, reflexive assertion of the rights of persons who achieve the
status of parent by childbirth. While paying lip service to the parental rights
of minors, the law fails to support adolescent parenting in reality. The next
Part examines areas of family law that, in practice, deal directly with minors
as parents. In particular, this Part focuses on child welfare and adoption law.
A closer study of what happens when minor parents come into contact with
the law reveals that the formalist approach to parental rights that informs the
law’s surface grant of autonomy to teenage parents does not carry through to
substantively protect the rights of minor parents. In some contexts, as in
adoption law, the law’s authorization of adult-like parental “rights” to minors
may actually serve to undermine minors’ abilities to parent their children.
Minor mothers, in particular, endure the worst of both worlds: the lack of
governmental support faced by adult parents and the extensive state oversight
enforced upon minors.

B. Minor Parents’ Parental Rights in Practice
A more expansive inquiry into the law on minors’ reproductive decision
making reveals a troubling approach to adolescent pregnancy and parenting.
If we look at the whole picture of adolescents’ reproductive rights, comparing
abortion law and the law on minor parents’ parental rights, we will see that
the law undermines adolescents’ rights whichever path of pregnancy resolution they choose. At the same time that the law thwarts adolescents’ access to
abortion care, it also fails to protect adolescents’ rights as parents. Although,
in theory, minor parents possess the same rights as adults to bear and rear
children, in reality, minor parents’ parental rights are tenuous.149 Minor par-

147. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1615–21 (analyzing legal
reforms in juvenile justice and medical decision-making, and concluding that reform
is an illusion).
148. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 86, at xii–iii, 174–244 (discussing how rhetoric of children’s rights is used in law and politics to further adults’ interests).
149. Id. at 244.
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ents from poor communities and, in particular, racial minorities, remain doubly vulnerable to disruption of their parental rights.
This Part more closely examines the reality of minor parents’ abilities to
rear their children and unmasks similarities in the law’s approach to adolescent abortion and adolescent parenthood, similarities that scholars have previously overlooked. This Part focuses primarily on adolescent mothers, given
the greater likelihood of their involvement in parenting decisions.150 This
Part examines how minor mothers fare when they come into contact with the
legal system, particularly within the contexts of child welfare law and adoption law. This examination reveals two key insights. First, the law takes a
highly skeptical view of adolescent girls’ reproductive decision making,
whether they seek to terminate their pregnancies or to parent their children.
Second, legal rules that claim to protect adolescents’ interests, such as judicial bypass in the abortion context and the right to relinquish in the adoption
context, instead provide a means to punish female teenage sexuality and enforce gender norms. Rather than standing in conflict, the law on minor parents operates in conjunction with abortion law to enforce a traditional gender
script – that self-sacrificing mothers should give birth and give up their infants to better circumstances than teenage parents can presumably provide.151
As this Part will show, adolescent parents remain at an especially high
risk of oversight by the child welfare system and, therefore, of having the
state remove their children from their custody.152 Although ample research
has shown that poor minority adult parents also face a high risk of scrutiny by
child welfare agents, minor mothers encounter multiple layers of bias based
on their age, as well as their race, poverty, and gender.153 Girls in foster care
who confront a higher risk of teenage pregnancy remain particularly vulnerable to the involuntary removal of their infants or pressure to surrender for
adoption, due in part to state officials’ skepticism of teenagers’ abilities to
parent. The tenuousness of minors’ legal rights to access abortion or to parent their children is especially apparent for the most vulnerable groups of

150. Other scholars have examined the ways in which adolescent fathers’ rights
are also given short shrift, particularly in the adoption context. See infra Part II.B.2.
151. See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1308–10 (discussing the consistent
notion in anti-abortion law of punishing women’s sexual irresponsibility).
152. The “child welfare system” refers to the government system responsible for
preventing and addressing child abuse and neglect. How the Child Welfare System
Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY 1 (Feb. 2013), https://www.childwelfare.
gov/pubs/factsheets/cpswork.pdf; Issue Brief: Rebuild the Nation’s Child Welfare
System, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. (Jan. 2009), http://www.aecf.org/m/resource
doc/aecf-IssueBriefRebuildChildWelfareSystem-2009.pdf. Parents and children in
the child welfare system may receive services in their home, through foster care, or
through adoptive placements. How the Child Welfare System Works, supra, at 3.
Proceedings to adjudicate child abuse or neglect cases are also referred to as “dependency proceedings.” Id. at 4.
153. See Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 331.
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minors, as laws restricting access to abortion and child welfare practices disproportionately affect the poor and racial minorities.
With regard to adoption law, opponents of abortion present adoption as
a better alternative to abortion, but research on adoption practices presents a
disturbing picture of unwarranted and less than voluntary removals of minor
parents’ infants by both private actors and state agents.154 To be clear, this
Article is not arguing for the removal of state oversight of teenage parents;
protecting the well-being of adolescent parents and their infants remains a
worthy goal. Rather, society needs more effective oversight that supports
minors’ reproductive decision making and seeks to preserve their parental
rights if they wish to parent their infants. The analysis below demonstrates
that, despite the formal grant of full parental rights to minor parents, the law
often undermines rather than supports those rights.

1. Minor Parents and the Child Welfare System
Experts generally agree that the child welfare system is broken.155 The
vast majority of child welfare cases involve poverty-related neglect rather
than severe abuse.156 Thousands of children are removed from their parents’
custody each year, even though few emerge better off than if they had remained in their homes.157 Teenage parents present particularly difficult challenges for the system.
The United States has the highest adolescent pregnancy rate and birth
rate of any industrialized nation.158 Each year, almost 750,000 girls between
the ages of fifteen and nineteen become pregnant. Roughly sixty percent of
these girls give birth.159 The lives of teenage mothers rarely resemble the
nearly idyllic reality of teen motherhood portrayed in media depictions, such
as the film, Juno, or the television show, Glee.
Although it is a common intuition that teenage parenthood is likely to
lead to poverty, recent research shows that teenage parenthood may be caused
154. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 98, at 1678 n.122 (describing the
rise of contemporary arguments for adoption as preferable to abortion).
155. See, e.g., Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
113, 114 (2013); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 637 (2006).
156. See Godsoe, supra note 155, at 115 n.7.
157. See id. at 114.
158. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 308. See also Fast Facts: Teen Birth
Rates: How Does the United States Compare?, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN
& UNPLANNED PREGNANCY (Aug. 2014), https://thenationalcampaign.org/resource/
fast-facts-how-does-united-states-compare.
159. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 308. For example, in 2008, 141,428 girls
under the age of eighteen gave birth. Id. About four percent of these mothers were
under the age of fifteen, twelve percent were age fifteen, and twenty-nine percent
were age sixteen. Id.; Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2008, 59 NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REP. 7 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_01.pdf.
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by poverty.160 Poor young women are more likely to become pregnant than
their economically better off peers.161 Teenage motherhood is a symptom of
poverty that often cycles to the next generation. Generally speaking, teenage
mothers are more likely to need public assistance compared to girls of similar
socio-economic status who postpone childbirth.162 Adolescent mothers are
also significantly less likely than their non-parenting peers to complete high
school or obtain a GED by the age of twenty-two.163 Furthermore, as with
adult parents, poverty places minor parents at a greater risk of oversight from
the child welfare system.164 Bias in the child welfare system has been the
subject of extensive study and criticism, and ample evidence suggests that
poverty and race place adult parents at a higher risk of state intervention.165
160. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 309; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, Ending Poverty by Cutting Teenaged Births: Promise, Failure, and Paths to the Future,
57 OHIO ST. L.J 441, 455 (1996) (“Teen mothers come overwhelmingly from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds.”); Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant:
Minors’ Consent in Abortion and Adoption, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 109–10
(2013) (discussing studies on a causal link between poverty and teen pregnancy).
161. See Merritt, supra note 160, at 443.
[S]tudies sound a warning that poor outcomes for the children of teenaged
mothers may derive more from poverty than from the teenaged births themselves. And the studies raise the dispiriting prospect that these women and
their children might not fare much better even if they deferred childbearing into their twenties.

Id. at 458–59.
162. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 309. Teenage mothers are disproportionately likely to be poor and to rely on welfare. Merritt, supra note 160, at 441–42. See
also NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 166–67 (2010) (“[N]umerous studies
find that delay in child bearing . . . increased mother and child prospects.”).
163. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 309 (sixty-six percent and ninety-four percent respectively). See Kate Perper et al., Fact Sheet: Diploma Attainment Among
Teen
Mothers,
CHILD
TRENDS
(Jan.
2010),
http://www.childtrends.org/files/child_trends-2010_01_22_FS_
diplomaattainment.pdf. Studies show teenage mothers are more likely to drop out of
school. Merritt, supra note 160, at 441; Daniel H. Klepinger et al., Adolescent Fertility and the Educational Attainment of Young Women, 27 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 23, 23
(1995) (analysis shows early childbearing lowers the education attainment of young
women of all races). Other demographic factors also influence the likelihood of teenage motherhood, such as family structure. See id.; see also Fact Sheet: American
Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health, GUTTMACHER INST. (May 2014), http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.html.
164. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 313; Erica Turcios et al., Remaining vs.
Removal: Preventing Premature Removal when Poverty is Confused with Neglect, 12
MICH. CHILD WELFARE L.J. 20, 23 (2009).
165. See, e.g., Godsoe, supra note 155 (summarizing evidence of racial bias in the
child welfare system); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2001) (arguing that the child welfare system is deeply racially biased);

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

37

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 19

164

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

However, teenage parents face additional hurdles to preserving their parental rights based on their minority. Multiple vectors of discrimination, including gender, race, and class, intersect with age-based concerns, leaving
minor parents doubly vulnerable to disruption of their parental rights. Minor
parents are generally more likely to come into contact with the child welfare
system than adult parents.166 For mothers age fifteen or younger, the risk of
the state removing their child from their care due to neglect or abuse are nearly double that of mothers between twenty and twenty-one years old.167 Adolescents who are themselves wards of the state are more likely to become teen
parents than their peers,168 presenting particularly thorny problems for the
child welfare system.169 This population of parenting wards “is nearly invisible in the academic literature of both law and the social sciences, in state polElizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child Welfare: False
Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871 (2009) (debating the reasons
for disproportionate numbers of minority families, particularly black families, in the
child welfare system).
166. See Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 310.
167. See id. (“Teen mothers between the ages of eighteen and nineteen are onethird more likely to have a child put in foster care and are nearly 40% more likely to
have a case of abuse or neglect reported against them than women who waited until
age twenty or twenty-one to have their first child.”); Robert M. Goerge et al., Consequences of Teen Childbearing for Child Abuse, Neglect, and Foster Care Placement,
in KIDS HAVING KIDS: ECONOMIC COSTS & SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TEEN
PREGNANCY 276 (Saul D. Hoffman & Rebecca A. Maynard eds., 2d ed. 2008)
(“[C]hildren born to mothers age 15 or younger as nearly two times (1.75) as likely as
children born to mothers age 20–21 to have an indicated child abuse or neglect report,
and children born to mothers age 16–17 are 1.41 times as likely to become victims of
child abuse or neglect, even after controlling for the other demographic factors.”).
168. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 310–11; Eve Stotland & Cynthia Godsoe,
The Legal Status of Pregnant and Parenting Youth in Foster Care, 17 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2006) (“[D]ata demonstrates not just that a significant number of
foster youth are pregnant and parenting, but that the incidence of pregnancy and
parenthood is higher among foster youth than among their peers.”). A national study
found that the rate of teen parenthood for girls in foster care was almost double as
compared to girls outside the system (17.2% and 8.2% respectively). Id.; see also
Briefly: Opportunities to Help Youth in Foster Care: Addressing Pregnancy Prevention in the Implementation of the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing
Adoptions Act of 2008, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED
PREGNANCY 1 (2009), https://thenationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resourceprimary-download/Briefly_Youth_Foster_Care.pdf (showing that teenage girls in
foster care are 2.5 times more likely to get pregnant by age nineteen than their peers
not in foster care); PETER J. PECORA ET AL., FOSTER CARE ALUMNI STUDIES,
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF FOSTER CARE: EARLY RESULTS FROM THE CASEY
NATIONAL
ALUMNI
STUDY
23
(2003),
http://www.casey.org/media/AlumniStudy_US_Report_Full.pdf.
169. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 310–14; Stotland & Godsoe, supra note
168, at 5–7 (discussing demographics and legal issues facing pregnant and parenting
minors in foster care).
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icies, in practice guides for children’s attorneys and guardians ad litem, and
in the demographic data on children in foster care.”170 An adolescent parent
who herself was a victim of abuse and neglect remains accountable to the
same extent as an adult to charges of child abuse or neglect of her child.171
Yet, the child welfare system does little to ensure that the cycle of abuse does
not repeat itself.172 Research shows that adolescents in foster care are more
likely to become teenage parents, and children born to teen mothers are more
likely to end up in foster care.173 Sarah Katz, a lawyer for parents in dependency cases, describes this double-edged system of “protection”:
I am startled by how quickly the system turns the tables on young parents, holding them accountable for their lack of independent living
skills or poor judgment as parents—the very proficiencies that the dependency and delinquency systems are supposed to provide in loco
parentis.174

Minor parents in the foster care system are at a particularly high risk of
having both inadequate access to abortion care, especially in states with parental involvement mandates, and of losing custody of their infants.175 Although there are legal and economic incentives for the child welfare system to
allow foster children to maintain custody of their infants, child welfare scholars have surfaced ample evidence that, in practice, state officials often ignore
170. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 61. For example, one study in New
York found that the New York City foster care system did not report any data on
youth in their care who became parents. See Jill E. Sheppard & Mark A. Woltman,
Children Raising Children: City Fails to Adequately Assist Pregnant and Parenting
Youth in Foster Care, PUB. ADVOC. FOR CITY N.Y. 3 (May 2005), http://www.nyc.
gov/html/records/pdf/govpub/2708children_raising_children.pdf.
171. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 2–3.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Alison Stewart Ng & Kelleen Kaye, Why It Matters: Teen Childbearing and
Child Welfare, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY
(2013),
https://thenationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resource-primarydownload/childbearing-childwelfare.pdf; see also Sarah Katz, When the Child is a
Parent: Effective Advocacy for Teen Parents in the Child Welfare System, 79 TEMP.
L. REV. 535, 535–53 (2006) (describing failures of the child welfare system to protect
the parental rights of minor parents in foster care).
174. Katz, supra note 173, at 535; see also Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at
23 (“The pervasiveness of such threats [to remove infants from parenting wards] also
reflects the foster care system’s readiness to switch alliances as a ward reaches adolescence. Now that she has a child, the same system that cast the ward as a helpless
victim is quick to cast her as the enemy.”).
175. See Rebouché, supra note 5, at 194–96; NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN &
FAMILIES, supra note 107, at 9; Kara Sheli Walis, Note, No Access, No Choice: Foster Care Youth, Abortion, and State Removal of Children, 18 CUNY L. REV. 119
(2014) (discussing difficulties of foster care youth in accessing abortion and maintaining custody of their infants).
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minors’ parental rights.176 Historically, state agents often viewed parenting
wards as inherently inadequate parents, and accordingly, they separated infants from their teenage mothers.177 A combination of prejudices based on
the age, class, and race of parenting wards worked against teenage mothers’
rights to maintain custody of their infants.178 Supposedly “voluntary” surrenders of infants to foster care or adoption frequently resulted from coercive
pressures, including lack of financial resources, denial of housing unless the
minor parent surrendered her legal rights to her infant, and lack of understanding of legal rights.179 One commentator observes:
“[V]oluntary” separation of parenting wards [minor parents in foster
care] from their children is frequently the result of coercive measures;
specifically young mothers have been pushed into giving up their
children because of a lack of available services and funding. Foster
care staff may threaten removal of their children, coercing these mothers into following strict rules and into not complaining about inadequate care.180

Stories abound of child welfare workers unjustifiably removing children
from teenage mothers under the guise of child protection.181 For example,
due to a shortage of placement availability for mother/child pairs in the foster
care system, minor parents may suffer unwanted, and sometimes illegal, separations from their children.182 In their study of parenting youth in foster care,
Eve Stotland and Cynthia Godsoe find:
Most disturbingly, advocates across the country report that states and
counties frequently violate parenting ward’s due process rights by coercing teens into “voluntarily” placing their child in government custody, separating wards from their children absent proper judicial find176. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 14–25 (discussing policies in four
states with regard to parenting wards and difficulties parenting wards face in maintaining custody of their children).
177. See Rebecca Bonagura, Redefining the Baseline: Reasonable Efforts, Family
Preservation, and Parenting Foster Children in New York, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 175, 181 (2008).
178. Id. at 179–81.
179. See In re C., 607 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1015–16 (Fam. Ct. 1994); In re Tricia
Lashawanda M., 451 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (describing “lightning quick
maneuvers” used to separate minor parent from her infant immediately after child
birth).
180. Bonagura, supra note 177, at 181–82.
181. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 23 (discussing “a problem noted by
advocates for parenting wards in all of the survey states – threats by foster care staff
to remove a parenting ward’s child if the parenting ward fails to follow program rules
or the ward’s service plan, even though the ward’s behavior clearly does not rise to
the level of abuse or neglect as defined by relevant state law”).
182. Id. at 45–46.
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ings, and threatening to remove infants from wards’ care based on infractions which do not pose an imminent risk of harm to the baby. 183

One study describes the rationale for removal as based on fear of teenage girls’ abilities to parent:
The majority of caseworkers in the foster care system were terrified of
being blamed for something happening to babies of teen mothers, and
thus they tended to take the babies and put them in separate homes.
They didn’t worry that this was against the law, which permitted removal only in cases of imminent risk. For them imminent risk was
synonymous with teenage mothers. 184

Although reported cases in this context are few, one striking case illustrates the worst (one hopes) of these practices. In In re Tricia Lashawnda M.,
a family court in New York found that child welfare workers improperly
sought termination of a teenage girl’s parental rights and had long denied her
right to be united with her child.185 The mother, Catherine Linda, declared to
be a neglected child and was placed with the Commissioner of Social Services for shelter care prior to her fourteenth birthday.186 The following year,
she gave birth to her daughter, provoking a series of actions by state officials
apparently aimed at thwarting her parental rights.187 As the court described,
“upon being wheeled out of the delivery room, less than a half hour after she
regained consciousness, and while still under the effects of the anesthetic,”
Catherine Linda’s own social worker had her sign a “consent” instrument
surrendering her baby to the agency.188 After a “series of lightning quick
maneuvers,” Catherine Linda “found herself no longer under the care of this
agency which had now conveniently taken over her own child as its ward to
her own exclusion.”189 Even though facilities did exist for co-residence of
mothers and infants, the child welfare agents chose instead to keep mother
and child separated.190 The court found that Catherine Linda made numerous
efforts to maintain a relationship with her daughter and to regain her custody,
“in spite of every possible obstacle, in spite of the Commissioner’s dismal
failure to meet his statutory responsibilities to his ward to keep her united
183. Id. at 61.
184. BETSY KREBS & PAUL PITCOFF, BEYOND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM: THE

FUTURE FOR TEENS 82 (2006); see also Katz, supra note 173, at 536–37 (describing
case in which minor parent’s child was adjudicated dependent based solely on parent’s status as a minor in foster care by the trial court, a decision which the appeals
court later overturned).
185. In re Tricia Lashawanda M., 451 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (Fam. Ct. 1982).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 554–56.
188. Id. at 554.
189. Id.
190. See id.
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with her child.”191 The court ultimately concluded that the “best interests of
this infant would appear to be served by uniting her with her mother.”192
While Catherine Linda’s story may represent an extreme case of mistreatment, more recent research on parenting wards describes similar stories
of the child welfare system’s denial of resources to support minors who wish
to parent their children – a lack of support that often results in the deprivation
of parental rights.193 Overall, evidence indicates that minor parents in foster
care “face an up-hill struggle to maintain custody of their children even where
no one has accused them of being unfit to parent.”194 In addition, in child
welfare law generally, and especially with adolescent parenting wards, the
“overlay of racial bias and economic inequality is impossible to ignore.”195
When youth in foster care, who are disproportionately poor and racial minorities, “lose their children to the system, the social inequalities that contributed
to the wards’ initial placement are revisited upon a second generation.”196
Thus, the child welfare system’s “failure to support parenting wards creates
foster care ‘legacy’ families, every generation of which is raised in the statecontrolled environment of foster care.”197
Unwarranted removal of their children remains an ongoing hazard, especially for minor parents in the foster care system, but teenage parents from
less marginalized populations still confront similar risks.198 The disabilities
of minority, such as the inability to form a contract, place minor parents at a
greater risk of losing their children in a dependency proceeding.199 A number
of commentators have noted that teenage parents are likely to have their parenting more closely scrutinized and are more likely to interact with individuals who are mandated reporters of abuse and neglect who may assume that
191. Id. at 561.
192. Id. at 562.
193. See, e.g., SHEPPARD & WOLTMAN, supra note 170, at 3 (describing a survey

that found “a significant number of young women served by the foster care system
have children and uncovered major lapses in the City services for these young mothers”); ROBERTS, supra note 165, at 87–88 (describing reports of New York City’s
child welfare agency pressuring teen mothers to give up infants to relieve shortages in
foster homes); YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., INC., CARING FOR OUR CHILDREN:
IMPROVING THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM FOR TEEN MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 7–9
(1995) (on file with author) (describing parenting wards’ struggles while in foster care
to maintain relationships with their children and prejudices they faced from child
welfare agents); YOUTH ADVOCACY CTR., INC., THE FUTURE FOR TEENS IN FOSTER
CARE (2001) (on file with author) (discussing foster care system’s focus on controlling or punishing parenting wards rather than supporting their futures).
194. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 25.
195. Id. at 60; see also ROBERTS, supra note 165.
196. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 60.
197. Id. at 61.
198. See Kendra Huard Fershee, A Parent Is a Parent, No Matter How Small, 18
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 425, 427 (2012).
199. Id. at 432–33 (2012); Katz, supra note 173, at 544 (discussing how disabilities of minority may negatively affect minor parents’ ability to parent their children).
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children of minor parents are at risk simply by virtue of the parents’ minority.200 Once subject to review by child welfare workers, skepticism toward
girls’ reproductive and parenting decision making drives a tendency to disrupt their parental rights.201
One other common strain of thought underlies these practices and
threads through both child welfare and adoption law.202 The common conception that appears to animate resistance to supporting teenagers’ parental
rights is that termination of a minor parent’s parental rights and placement of
the infant for adoption will serve the best interests of both children: the minor
parent and her infant.203 In theory, the minor parent would be free to pursue
educational and career opportunities, and her child could be raised in a more
stable home by experienced adults desiring to parent.204 However, evidence
does not support the contention that, generally speaking, termination of parental rights results in positive consequences for both the adolescent parent
and her child.205 Even if it is generally true that children of teenage parents
do not fare as well as those of adult parents, it does not follow that those children will necessarily fare better or even find alternative placements, especially if parents or state officials coerce removal of the minor parent’s infant.206
200. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 311–12; Stotland & Godsoe, supra note
168, at 6–7; Bonagura, supra note 177, at 181–82.
201. Katz, supra note 173, at 554 (“Courts, advocates, and social service providers often assume that the teenager is a per se unfit parent or may bypass the teenager’s
parental rights simply because of her youth.”).
202. Id. at 555.
203. Id.
204. See Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 816 (noting
policy reasons for terminating rights of minor parents); Shannon S. Carothers et al.,
Children of Adolescent Mothers: Exposure to Negative Life Events and the Role of
Social Supports on Their Socioemotional Adjustment, 35 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE
827, 828 (2006) (discussing negative consequences that adolescent parenting has on
both the minor parent and her child). It is also true that child welfare law more generally prioritizes adoption above all other solutions for children in the system. See
Godsoe, supra note 155, at 114; ROBERTS, supra note 165.
205. See Godsoe, supra note 155, at 146.
206. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 333–34 (discussing negative aspects of
termination of parental rights for minor parents); see also Buss, The Parental Rights
of Minors, supra note 111, at 825–26 (“We know that many children do not fare particularly well with minor parents, but we do not know how they would fare with others, especially if they knew that they were taken from their birth mothers against their
will.”). Complicated issues arise when the minor parent, herself a ward of the state, is
charged with neglect or abuse of her child:
After all, which child do we seek to protect – the struggling teen or vulnerable
infant? In many situations, the minor parent’s and child’s interests are aligned
in remaining together, presenting the possibility of a mutually beneficial outcome. Nevertheless, hard cases exist in which the interests of the ward and
her child clearly diverge.
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Involuntary removal of a child from his or her parents may have long-term
negative consequences for both the teenage parent and her infant.207 As Barbara Glesner Fines explains:
For teen parents, that loss is not less than when adults have their parental rights terminated. A relinquishment is not cost free to any parent. . . . One can presume that the loss is equal if not more profound
when the parent has her rights terminated. For teen parents, the loss
and grief of relinquishing or losing a child is aggravated by the circumstances of fewer resources to make these decisions and less emotional maturity to cope with the emotional fallout.208

For a minor parent in foster care who typically has little family other
than her own children, “[t]he possibility that her child will relive her fate may
be particularly devastating.”209 Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a minor parent pressured into giving up her child will have educational or career
opportunities that will improve her economic circumstances, or that her child
will find an adoptive placement rather than languish in foster care.210 To the
Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 60. These situations could be better addressed
through alternatives to complete termination of parental rights, as discussed further
infra Part III.B.
207. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 333–34 (children removed from teen parents can suffer with life-long identify issues, while the teen parents often also struggle
with loss of self-worth and identity with profound consequences on future ability to
parent, resulting in cutting themselves off from various low skill job opportunities
such as child care and medical assisting); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing negative consequences to minor parents pressured into giving up their children).
208. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 317–18 (quoting Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to the Adoption of Their
Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 529 (2005)) (“Research presents ‘a growing
body of recent research data which has supported the claims of birth parents that relinquishing a child is indeed a profound loss experience, and that this loss even can
have long-term deleterious results.’ These negative effects can be mitigated with
‘sufficient resources and support to make an informed and deliberate choice.’”). “The
termination of parental rights has been characterized as tantamount to a ‘civil death
penalty.’” In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (quoting In re
N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. App. 2002); In re Parental Rights as to K.D.L., 118
Nev. 737, 58 P.3d 181, 186 (2002)). “It is a drastic intrusion into the sacred parentchild relationship.” Id. (quoting In re P.C., B.M., & C.M., 62 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2001)).
209. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 23. California passed legislation
recognizing the unique problems faced by parenting wards and that both children’s
best interests are served by efforts to keep minor parents and their infants together.
See S.B. 1178, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2004); see also Bonagura, supra note 177,
at 226–31 (describing California legislation on rights of parenting wards).
210. See Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, supra note 111, at 825–26 (“We
might also worry whether it is realistic to expect the state to find alternative families
for babies whose relinquishment is compelled. This would be a particular concern for
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contrary, poor and racial minority minor parents and their infants have much
more limited economic opportunities for stable adoptive placements.211
Although, in theory, minor parents possess the same rights as adult parents to rear their children, child welfare practices indicate that, in reality, the
law allows for a deep skepticism toward the rights of minor parents to parent
their children.212 Particularly for minor parents in foster care, social workers
and judges “too often take a policing approach toward [parenting wards] that
is adversarial and punitive, rather than supportive, educational, and preventative.”213 Yet, “Just as poverty should not be confused with neglect, so too a
parent’s youth should not be taken as synonymous with an imminent risk of
harm to their child.”214 Reflecting the problem of under-funding and racial
and class bias endemic to the child welfare system, the law often responds by
taking adolescent mothers’ children away from their care, rather than by
providing needed resources to support their parenting.215

2. Minor Parents and Adoption Law
The child welfare system’s disregard of minors’ parental rights has parallels in adoption law.216 Adoption occurs by two methods: (1) the state can
terminate parental rights based on severe abuse or neglect and place the child
for adoption, or (2) parents can voluntarily relinquish their child for adop-

babies who are members of racial minority groups whose placement prospects are
generally more limited.”); see also Amanda T. Perez, Transracial Adoption and the
Federal Adoption Subsidy, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 201, 203 (1998) (describing the
“severity of the gap in placement rates between minority and non-minority children”).
211. See ROBERTS, supra note 165. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare’s
Paradox, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV 881 (2007) (discussing child relocation services in
a black community and the affect it has on the community and the children); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV 171 (2003).
212. Bonagura, supra note 177, at 202.
213. Id. at 178 (footnote omitted). Cost savings are another possible motivation
for the state’s desire to pressure minor parents to relinquish their infants for adoption,
in order for the state to have one less minor to support and in line with the theory that
family law seeks to “privatize dependency.” See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Divorce
Bargain: The Father’s Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79
(2016) (describing the law’s push in both private and public family law domains to
privatize dependency).
214. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 326.
215. See Godsoe, supra note 155, at 170; ROBERTS, supra note 165; Bonagura,
supra note 177, at 176 (“The complicated reality behind these numbers [of higher
rates of pregnancy and foster care for parenting wards] is that because of state failure
to provide the placements, services, and support necessary to function successfully as
a family, parenting wards and their children are often denied the opportunity to remain together.”); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY (1998).
216. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 153–54.
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tion.217 Strikingly, there are generally no special protections for minor parents in either circumstance; most state laws treat adult parents and minor parents exactly the same in rules for involuntary termination and voluntary relinquishment.218 Abortion opponents often present adoption as the better alternative to abortion, but research on the adoption of minor parents’ infants presents a troubling picture of unwarranted terminations of parental rights, lessthan-voluntary relinquishments, and difficulty finding placements for racial
minority children.
The first method of adoption – the involuntary termination of parental
rights – arises in the context of a child welfare dependency proceeding, such
as a child abuse or neglect case.219 As discussed previously, in many cases,
the child welfare system’s failure to adequately support minor parents leads
to a higher incidence of adolescent parents being charged with abuse or neglect and a higher risk of losing their infant, either through an involuntary
termination proceeding or through pressure to “voluntarily” relinquish their
child.220
The second method of adoptive placement – voluntary relinquishment or
“surrender” of a child – also raises special concerns in the context of adolescent parenting. In addition to those minors whose parental rights are at risk
for termination by the child welfare system, “5% of teen birth mothers affirmatively relinquish their children for adoption.”221 The overall picture of
voluntary relinquishment by minor parents remains quite murky because
“[t]hese processes of relinquishment are less visible, with less certain rights
to representation, than involuntary termination processes.”222 Moreover,
“The degree to which these mothers’ decisions are voluntary is difficult to
assess.”223 As described in Part II.B.1, evidence from the child welfare context suggests that parenting wards may be coerced into “voluntarily” surrendering their children, sometimes due to a lack of services.224 While child
welfare law disproportionately impacts poor minority parents, adoption law
practices, both historically and with modern day revocation rules, suggest that
even less marginalized groups of adolescent mothers remain subject to disdain for their parental rights. Revocation case law, discussed further below,
217. See Tracey B. Harding, Note, Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights:
Reform is Needed, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 895, 895 (2001).
218. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 129.
219. See Karl A.W. Demarce, Note, Stepparent Adoption and Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: When Petitioners Come to Court with Unclean Hands, 61
MO. L. REV. 995, 1000–01 (1996).
220. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 310.
221. Id. at 313.
222. Id.
223. Id. (“Programs, parents, and even potential adoptive parents may create subtle or overt pressures for voluntary relinquishment.”).
224. See Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 61; In re C., 607 N.Y.S.2d 1014,
1015–16 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994) (discussing ways in which parenting wards may be
coerced into “voluntarily” relinquishing their infants).
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indicates that some teenage mothers “voluntarily” relinquish their infants as a
result of pressure from their own family, adoptive families and agencies, or
state officials, and these mothers face extreme difficulties getting their infants
back when they wish to set aside their consent to the adoption.
For the most part, state law governs adoption, and therefore, technical
requirements vary. In a traditional or “closed” adoption, adoption terminates
all legal and social contact between a child and his or her biological family.225
The move to “open” adoption in the United States has shifted this practice
somewhat, because open adoptions allow varying degrees of ongoing social
contact between the adopted child and his or her biological family.226 However, open adoptions still sever the legal parental tie between the biological
parents and their child, and moreover, agreements for ongoing contact with
the birth parents may not be enforceable.227 Adoption requires the consent of
both parents to relinquish the child and terminate parental rights or, alternatively, proof that a parent is unfit in an involuntary termination proceeding.
Consent to adoption is generally irrevocable, with a few statutory exceptions
examined further below.228
Typically, due to the permanence of terminating parental rights and “a
veneration for the maternal-child bond,” state law extensively regulates the
timing, procedures, and formal requirements for birth mother relinquishment
to ensure that consent is voluntary.229 Generally, adoption statutes require a
biological parent’s written consent to relinquish the child and that the consent
be made before a third party, such as a judge, notary, or other disinterested
witness.230 Rules for the timing and revocation of consent vary among the
states, but generally, consent cannot be revoked outside of the established
time window unless the biological parent proves fraud or duress.231
Almost every state provides that maternal consent for adoption cannot
be given until after the birth of the child, and a number of states prescribe the
number of hours or days that must pass after the child’s birth before the

225. See Jessica R. Caterina, Note, Glorious Bastards: The Legal and Civil Birthright of Adoptees to Access Their Medical Records in Search of Genetic Identity, 61
SYRACUSE L. REV. 145, 150 (2010).
226. Id.
227. Leigh Gaddie, Open Adoption, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 499, 501
(2009) (discussing the current status and development of open adoption law in the
United Stated); see also Annette Ruth Appell, Reflections on the Movement Toward a
More Child-Centered Adoption, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2010).
228. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 72.
229. Id. See Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.11[2].
230. See, e.g., Mary M. Beck, Adoption of Children in Missouri, 63 MO. L. REV.
423, 450 (1998).
231. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 72; Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.12
(citing Katherine G. Thompson & Joan H. Hollinger, Contested Adoptions: Strategy
of the Case, in 2 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02[1][a]–[b] (Joan H. Hollinger
ed., 2013)).
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mother can give a valid consent.232 A few states provide additional protections to ensure the validity of the biological parents’ consent. For example,
Michigan does not allow a biological parent to grant consent for adoption
until an investigation occurs and a judge fully explains her rights to the parent.233 In Colorado, a parent must receive counseling before consenting to
adoption.234
Few states limit the ability of a minor parent to consent to her child’s
adoption.235 A small number of states require either a minor mother’s parents
to consent to or a judge to approve the surrender of her parental rights.236
Other than a limited number of exceptions, most states’ adoption laws either
explicitly provide that the minority status of a parent does not affect her competency to consent or make no mention of treating minor parents differently.237 In sum, “with near uniformity, adoption law reinforces the autonomy of
a minor’s decision to finally and irrevocably relinquish a child,” ignoring the
developmental conditions of youth that courts so emphasize in the abortion
context.238
A number of commentators have argued that the differential treatment
of abortion and adoption highlights the law’s disfavor of abortion.239 Unlike
STI treatment or pregnancy-related care, adoption generally does not involve
a medical situation posing physical health risks to the pregnant minor or her
child that would justify eliminating the general requirement of parental consent.240 Given the recognition that parents have a strong interest in involve232. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73; Hollinger, supra note 79, at §
2.11[1][a] (noting that typical times for consent after birth are twelve, forty-eight, or
seventy-two hours after childbirth or ten days after childbirth); see also State Statutory Provisions Relating to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
79, at §§ 1-A.01–1-A.51 (state by state summary of the time at which consents may be
executed and at the time of which consents become irrevocable).
233. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.44
(West 2016); see also State Statutory Provisions Relating to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 79, at § 1-A.23.
234. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73; see also State Statutory Provisions
Relating to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 79, at § 1-A.09.
235. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 72; Seymore, supra note 160, at 129–33
(summarizing state laws on minor parents and adoption relinquishment).
236. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 77.
239. See, e.g., id. at 69 (“The disparities between the legal treatment of adults and
minors are highlighted when a pregnancy occurs, when one choice (adoption) elevates
a minor’s legal status to that of an adult, while another choice (abortion) treats the
minor as a child whose decision is subject to parental or judicial approval.”).
240. Id. at 77. It is possible that requiring parental consent or notice prior to a
minor parent’s decision to relinquish a child for adoption could delay the adoption,
and states generally have a policy of ensuring that adoption occurs speedily after the
birth of a child. However, most states impose parental consent or notice requirements
for minors’ abortion care despite evidence that delays in accessing abortion care can
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ment with their minor child’s decision to have an abortion, surely parents also
have a strong interest in a minor child’s decision to give up her child – their
grandchild – for adoption. Relinquishment of a child is a major life decision
that leads to cutting off all ties with blood relatives in a closed adoption, and
it may cause deep regret in some birth parents.241 Minor unwed mothers may
especially be subject to inappropriate pressures to relinquish their infants for
adoption and may need additional support through the decision-making process.242 Yet, the possibility of youthful regret does not limit a minor parent’s
decision to relinquish her infant for adoption. In fact,
[R]egardless of whether a state’s adoption statute mentions minor
birth mothers, the general rule is that the minority of a birth parent
will not free her from the consequences of her relinquishment, altalso have negative health consequences. See supra note 125 and accompanying text
(citing references to evidence on harms of delayed access to abortion care). Regarding states’ interest in securing speedy adoption, courts have upheld laws that limit the
rights of unwed fathers to prevent mothers from giving up their child for adoption
against constitutional challenge based on the need for timely adoptions. See Mary L.
Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and
the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 82–83 (1995) (discussing case
law limiting rights of unwed fathers to prevent adoption of their children). Statutes
offering extremely limited parental rights to unwed fathers in the adoption context
have been upheld as serving the important state interest in expediting the secure adoption of children. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 635 N.W.2d 256, 262
(Neb. 2001). State courts addressing the rights of unwed fathers in the adoption context have emphasized that the “immediate secure adoption of children is an important
state interest,” which is best served by “the placement of children as soon after birth
as possible.” Id. at 265; see also Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc’y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199
(Utah 1984), abrogated on other grounds by In re Adoption of J.S., 358 P.3d 1009
(Utah 2014). The parents of minor unwed fathers also have no right to notice that
their grandchild may be given up for adoption by the unwed mother, even if the result
is termination of parental rights to the child. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 635
N.W.2d at 266 (noting that the adoption statutes governing unwed father’s rights do
not require notice to be served on parents of a minor unwed father). Hollinger explains that rules on consent are always balancing tension between wanting valid consent and wanting speedy adoption. Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.11[1][a] (“The
legal rules on the timing of consents are ultimately a compromise between the interest
in protecting biological mothers from making hasty or ill-informed decisions at a time
of great physical and emotional stress, and the interest in expediting the adoption
process for newborns.”).
241. See Shanley, supra note 240, at 96–97 (describing cases where bio-mom
regretted her decision to relinquish her child for adoption and voided adoption years
later with help from bio-dad whose rights were not properly terminated).
242. See Susan Frelich Appleton & Robert A. Pollak, Exploring the Connections
Between Adoption and IVF: Twibling Analyses, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 60, 64
(2011) (footnote omitted) (“[W]e can find in the case law and literature on domestic
adoption reasons to question the voluntariness of birth parents’ consent to adoption,
especially when the parent is a young, sexually active female or an unmarried father.”).
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hough had the same young woman entered into a commercial contract,
she could void it at any time. 243

Thus, despite similar sets of interests at stake in a minor’s decision to
terminate her pregnancy or to terminate her parental rights through adoption,
the law mandates parental or judicial consent only when a teenager chooses
abortion.244 However, this apparent contrast on the surface of the law masks
the similar underlying motivations and parallel effects of these legal rules. A
closer study of adoption law reveals two key similarities in both the rules
denying autonomy to girls seeking abortion and granting autonomy to girls
relinquishing their infant for adoption. First, both areas of law evince skepticism toward adolescent girls’ reproductive decision making, whether they
seek to terminate a pregnancy or to carry it to term. Second, in practice, both
areas of law operate as a means to punish teenage girls who transgress sexual
purity norms. I aim to emphasize here not the superficial conflicts in the law,
but the deeper similarities in these legal rules that scholars have tended to
overlook. Although in some cases, adoption law likely protects the interests
of minor parents who have good reasons to relinquish their infants for adoption, in other cases, the grant of “rights” to minor parents to surrender their
infants serves to undermine rather than protect minor parents’ parental
rights.245 The case law on revocation of consent illustrates this point.
All states have promulgated statutory rules for revocation of consent,
but states take a variety of approaches to revocation.246 Revocation generally
depends on timing and whether the consent was taken in court or extrajudicially.247 Notably, “[A] mother’s minority is not a per se ground for rev-

243. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 74; Thompson & Hollinger, supra note
231, at § 8.02 [1][b].
244. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 76–77.
245. See Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 326.
246. Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02 [1][a].
247. Id. at § 8.02 [1][a][i]. Some states give explicit time frames during which
revocation is permitted. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 73. Others allow revocation only if the biological parent proves that consent was obtained through fraud or
duress. Id. Some states explicitly require that consent conform strictly to statutory
guidelines and, thus, allow revocation for deviation from the statutory guidelines. Id.
Yet others allow revocation only if it serves the best interests of the child placed for
adoption. Id. at 73–74; see also Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02
[1][a][i] & n.18; CAL. FAM. CODE § 9005(d) (West 2016) (“If the court finds that
withdrawal of the consent to adoption is reasonable in view of all the circumstances
and that withdrawal of the consent is in the child’s best interest, the court shall approve the withdrawal of the consent. Otherwise the court shall withhold its approval.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-2(f) (West 2016) (“A consent to adoption . . . may not
be withdrawn . . . without . . . a written finding that such action will be for the best
interests of the individual to be adopted.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b(3)(b)
(McKinney 2016) (“[T]he court . . . has determined that the best interests of the child
will be served by giving force and effect to such revocation.”).
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ocation of consent, even before the completion of the adoption.”248 As mentioned above, this means that the minority of a birth mother is not grounds for
revocation of her consent, even though under the infancy doctrine, she could
revoke a commercial contract. Although courts may take into account the
birth mother’s minority in assessing the voluntariness of her consent, the majority of reported decisions reject revocation on the basis of the birth mother’s
minority.249 Courts tend to rely on an analysis focusing on the best interests
of the adopted child, and courts tend to conclude that the mother’s minority
weighs against revocation because, based on her age, the court assumes that
she cannot adequately care for the child.250 A few cases have permitted revocation but primarily because the court found that revocation served the best
interests of the prospective adoptee rather than based on the minor birth
mother’s vulnerability.251 In the abortion context, the Supreme Court specifically relied on notions of minors’ presumed immaturity and vulnerability as
justifications for requiring either parental or judicial approval of the minor’s
decision to seek abortion care.252 Yet, courts generally have not considered
what this analysis means for minor parents’ voluntary relinquishment of their
children for adoption.253
248. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 74; Thompson & Hollinger, supra note
231, at § 8.02 [1][a][i].
249. See Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02[1][A][ii][b] nn.52–53;
see, e.g., Kathy O. v. Counseling & Family Servs., 438 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) (fifteen-year-old parent’s consent to adoption was not revocable based on minority).
250. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 74. See Thompson & Hollinger, supra
note 231, at § 8.02; see, e.g., Martin v. Ford, 277 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1955) (natural
mother was considered “still very young [,] . . . not married and is untrained in any
kind of work” in determining the order of adoption was valid); In re Duarte’s Adoption, 229 Cal. App. 2d 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (denying a fourteen-year-old mother’s request to revoke her consent to a private adoption, even where the child was
later legitimized by the natural mother marrying natural father); In re Adoption of
Baby C., 480 A.2d 101 (N.H. 1984) (natural mother’s minor age considered in determining that natural parents were totally unprepared for child rearing and withdrawal
of consent for adoption was not invalidated).
251. See Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 74; Thompson & Hollinger, supra
note 231, at § 8.02[1][a][i]. See, e.g., Graves v. Graves, 288 So. 2d 142 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1973) (holding that the best interest of the child is served by returning her to her
mother and revoking the consent of adoption to the grandparents even when there is
no duress, fraud, or coercion at time of consent); In re D., 408 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1966) (finding that it was in the best interest of two daughters to withdraw consent to adoption by grandparents but no duress, fraud, or coercion found). But see
Janet G. v. N.Y. Foundling Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (permitting a minor mother’s revocation of consent based on evidence that the mother had
not voluntarily, informingly, and knowingly surrendered her child for adoption, and
noting the special vulnerability minors experience when making important decisions).
252. See Bellotti v. Baird (Belotti II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
253. See Appleton, supra note 11, at 282; Seymore, supra note 160, at 154–55.
Courts also give short shrift to minor fathers’ interests in the adoption of their chil-
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So why declare minors to be immature for purposes of abortion consent,
but mature for purposes of adoption consent? First, as in child welfare law, a
skeptical view of an adolescent’s decision to become a teenage parent drives
the law, in practice. Scholars suspect that the belief that adolescent parents
should not exercise the right to parent their children explains why the law
treats minor birth parents like adults rather than like children within the adoption context.254 Expanding minors’ rights by permitting them to consent to
their infants’ adoptions ensures easier enforcement of supposedly voluntary
relinquishments, even in questionable circumstances. Cases in which birth
mothers have lost their attempts to revoke their consent, while only offering a
limited window into voluntary relinquishments, are illuminating here.255
One adoption revocation case, decided prior to Roe v. Wade,256 openly
articulates this rationale – that unmarried minor girls should not possess parental rights.257 In many cases, however, this pernicious purpose for denying
minor parents’ parental rights remains hidden from view. In 1955, an Arkansas court refused to allow a sixteen-year-old birth mother, Katherine, to set
aside her consent to adoption of her infant.258 Katherine had granted consent
for the adoption two days after giving birth and changed her mind only four
months thereafter, prior to a final adoption decree.259 The facts also suggested that Katherine’s physician pressured her into relinquishing her baby for
adoption based on her age, poverty, and the shame surrounding the infants’
illegitimacy and her sexual behavior.260 The court rejected revocation of
consent on the ground that allowing the adoption to stand would serve the
best interests of both Katherine and her infant.261 The court emphasized that
without her baby, the teenage mother “could lead a normal life” and would
not have to face her small town “where everyone in the community would
know of her plight.”262 As Professors Durcan and Appell note, the court

dren. See In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d 1026 (Utah 2010) (assuming the responsibilities of parenthood does not give a putative father a constitutionally protected right
to consent to the adoption of his child); see also Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.05.
254. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 75 (arguing that the desire to make it
easier to remove infants from teenage parents’ care is perhaps the rationale behind
treating minor birth parents like adults and not children in adoption cases).
255. See Samuels, supra note 208, at 571 (noting that revocation case law provides a window into voluntariness of consent for adoption and reviewing case law
where mothers’ sought to set aside their relinquishments).
256. 410 U.S. 113 (1793).
257. Martin v. Ford, 277 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1955).
258. Id. at 844–45.
259. Id. at 844.
260. See id. at 843–44, 846 (stating that doctor suggested adoption given Katherine’s circumstances, arranged for adoption with an infertile couple that he knew, and
offered her free medical care “for the purpose of influencing the decision she later
made”).
261. Id. at 845.
262. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/19

52

Manian: Minors, Parents, and Minor Parents

2016]

MINORS, PARENTS, AND MINOR PARENTS

179

“substituted its judgment of what was in the mother’s best interest for her
own assessment, giving rise to the apparent anomaly that the same minor is
mature enough to decide to relinquish her baby, but not to decide to keep the
child.”263 A number of other revocation cases also imply skepticism toward
adolescent girls’ decisions to parent their infants, and such cases enforce the
normative view that minor parents should not possess parental rights.264
Second, not only does the apparent expansion of adolescent rights within the adoption context serve to undermine minor parents’ parental rights in
some cases, but revocation case law also reveals that granting minor parents
an unfettered “right” to relinquish provides a means to punish teenage female
transgression of sexual mores. Susan Frelich Appleton conducted an extensive and fascinating study of reproduction and regret in the law with some
particularly poignant insights into the law of relinquishment and revocation.265 Professor Appleton notes that adoption law and practice have long
treated unmarried mothers as deviant and, hence, unfit to parent.266 Several
authors have recounted the long history of narratives of trauma and regret for
women pressured or forced to give up their infants for adoption in the preRoe era, particularly white mothers who could meet the demand for white
babies from infertile couples.267 This narrative continues to some extent today, most strikingly, in cases involving young birth mothers’ attempts at revocation.
For example, in a recent case from the Mississippi Supreme Court, In re
Adoption of D.N.T., the court declined to let a seventeen-year-old birth mother reclaim her baby, despite a troubling set of facts that the dissent characterized as “coercion” of the birth mother.268 The birth mother, Camille, changed
her mind about the adoption only two weeks after signing her consent and
after almost two years of raising her daughter. Camille consented to the
adoption while she was living with the adoptive couple who, evidence

263. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 75.
264. See cases cited infra notes 274–78. The push to privatize dependency may

also provide an additional explanation for the urge to have minor parents relinquish
their infants if courts are generally skeptical that minors can financially support an
infant and believe that minor mothers would be more capable of self-support upon
relinquishment.
265. Appleton, supra note 11, at 255.
266. Id. at 275.
267. Id.; see also ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES
BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2006); RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE
POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED
STATES 69–70 (2001). It is important to note that the law has differed significantly in
its treatment of white single mothers versus women of color. See generally Roberts,
supra note 211. Women of color have long been viewed as inherently deviant and
often face different kinds of challenges to their parental rights. See generally id. (addressing child relocation services in black communities).
268. In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 2003).
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showed, had pressured her to sign the adoption papers without having her
own lawyer or consulting with her own mother who had helped her raise her
daughter. The evidence showed that Camille believed she would have continued contact with her daughter, which the adopting couple denied almost
immediately post-adoption. Camille’s mother joined her in the suit to revoke
Camille’s consent and nullify the adoption.269
Despite these compelling facts, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled
against Camille and her mother in a revealing opinion. To justify its decision,
the court used several different tactics, including relying on “the state adoption consent statute that makes the parent’s age irrelevant, construing Camille’s initial surrender as an abandonment sufficient to justify termination of
parental rights and condemning Camille’s bad decisions and immaturity, including . . . her sexual relationship with her new boyfriend.”270 Notably, the
court relied on the lower court’s logic that when Camille gave birth, she became a parent and thus achieved emancipation.271 In response to Camille’s
contention that because minors must obtain parental or judicial consent for
abortion, the same should apply for adoption, the court replied:
A minor who is contemplating an abortion has not yet become a parent and there is a clear distinction in the law between the way a minor
child contemplating an abortion is treated and the way that a minor
child contemplating an adoption is considered and it’s the fact of that
child’s parenthood that makes that decision different. 272

In other words, when Camille gave birth, she achieved the status of parent, and thus, as described in Part II.A, the court superficially treated her like
an adult in her decisions about her child, in theory “respecting” her parental
rights. Yet, at the same time the court asserted that Camille should be treated
like an adult parent and held to her decision to relinquish, it also emphasized
Camille’s “immature” behavior, particularly her sexual behavior, which the
court gave as a reason that she should not continue to parent her daughter.273
The D.N.T. court’s rigidly formalistic analysis presents a striking example of
how courts can apply both the parent and child categories at the same time to
minor parents, but in a punitive rather than supportive manner. Because of
her formal status as “parent,” the court deems Camille to be mature enough to
269. Id. at 695–96.
270. Appleton, supra note 11, at 279. See In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d at

708.
271. See In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d at 709–10; Appleton, supra note 11,

at 282.
272. See In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d at 709.
273. Id. (“The record is replete with bad decisions Camille has made her entire

life. She has proven herself immature beyond understanding, as evidenced adequately by her own testimony of leaving [the baby] with almost strangers . . . while she
spent the nights at her new boyfriend’s house having sex and smoking marihuana
with him.”).
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consent to adoption, but by virtue of her age and sexual behavior, also deems
her too immature to parent her child. Other courts have engaged in strikingly
similar analyses in revocation cases.274
As Professor Appleton explains, although today most unmarried mothers who choose to give birth also choose to keep their child, “one still sees
stories of deep and anguished regret in reported cases of attempted revocations of adoption plans.”275 Yet, birth mothers typically can only prevail in a
revocation case when they can prove coercion or duress, and many courts
have set a high legal threshold to establish such a finding.276 For example,
274. See, e.g., Fowler v. Merkle, 564 So. 2d 960, 96–62 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)
(denying revocation of consent); Kayla P. v. Morgan C., No. 1 CA-JV 09-0190, 2010
WL 987071 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Kathy O. v. Counseling & Family Servs., 438
N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (fifteen-year-old parent’s consent to adoption was not
revocable based on minority); In re Minor Child David, 256 A.2d 583, 587–88 (Me.
1969); Grafe v. Olds, 556 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 1990) (denying revocation of consent
during period of placement of child with prospective parents and entry of adoption
decree); In re Adoption of A.D.A., 789 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (denying
revocation of consent); In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988);
In re Adoption of J.H., No. 06CA008902, 2006 WL 3257525, at *1, *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 13, 2006) (denying withdrawal of consent by seventeen-year-old); In re
Adoption of Morrison, 560 P.2d 240 (Okla. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that consent
executed by sixteen-year-old mother is effective even though she did not have counsel
or guardian ad litem and opining that requirement of court approval adequately protected minor parents); Sigurdson v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Serv. (In re Dependency of M.S.), 236 P.3d 214, 218 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting In re Adoption
of Baby Girl K., 615 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)). But see Ex parte Sullivan, 407 So. 2d 559 (Ala. 1981) (returning child to seventeen-year-old birth mother
even after passage of significant period of time due to failure to follow statutory requirements of adoption consent); A.F. v. Spence-Chapin Agency, 537 N.Y.S.2d 752
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (questioning whether minor father’s consent to adoption was
voluntary but nevertheless concluding that father’s consent was not required); Janet
G. v. Foundling Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (permitting minor
mother’s revocation of consent based on evidence that mother had not voluntarily,
informingly, and knowingly surrendered her child for adoption, and noting the special
vulnerability minors experience when making important decisions); see also Gary D.
Spivey, Annotation, What Constitutes “Duress” in Obtaining Parent’s Consent to
Adoption of Child or Surrender of Child to Adoption Agency, 74 A.L.R.3D 527
(1976); Jack W. Shaw, Annotation, What Constitutes Undue Influence in Obtaining A
Parent’s Consent to Adoption of Child, 50 A.L.R.3D 918 (1973).
275. Appleton, supra note 11, at 281.
276. Id. Whether there has been sufficient fraud or duress to warrant revoking a
birth parent’s consent is left up to the discretion of the courts. See Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02[1][b]. “Generally, . . . a challenge will not be permitted for duress of circumstances, or for what some courts refer to as a mere ‘transient
situational disturbance,’ particularly if an adoptive placement has already been
made.” Id. See In re Baby Boy R., 386 S.E.2d 839 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that
mother who signed voluntary relinquishment in hospital before a social worker and
notary, after being told about significance of her actions, cannot revoke her consent
for mere “duress of circumstances”). For example, a teenage mother in Florida con-
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one court openly declared, “‘proof of inexperience, indecisiveness, uncertainty, emotional stress and a failure to fully comprehend the effect of surrender’
is insufficient to justify revocation.”277 Thus, “Even when circumstances
raise serious questions about the voluntariness of the initial consent or surrender – as in D.N.T., when the birth mother is a minor and especially eager
prospective adopters have exploited her vulnerabilities – simple regret, no
matter how intensely felt, typically fails to carry the day in court.”278 Professor Appleton shows that the adoption case law and literature “suggest that

sented to a private placement without the use of an adoption agency or the statutorily
required pre-consent interview by an adoption entity. J.S. v. S.A., 912 So. 2d 650,
656–57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). Nevertheless, the court upheld the consent although the reliability was “open to grave question” and the third party’s conduct was
possibly criminal. Id. at 659. The record also showed that the mother’s consent resulted from social and financial pressures, which the court held did not amount to
fraud or duress. Id. “Neither emotional distress nor mistake of fact will ordinarily
constitute a sufficient ground to vitiate a consent to an adoption.” Thompson & Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02.
277. In re Dependency of M.S., 236 P.3d at 218 (alteration in original) (quoting In
re Adoption of Baby Girl K., 615 P.2d at 1310). See In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d
at 707 (citations omitted) (“It has also been recognized, in this regard, that suggestions, persuasion, arguments or entreaties in favor of adoption do not constitute the
‘kind of force’ which would sustain a finding of duress and thereby warrant the vacatur of a natural parent’s consent to an adoption. Thus, parental threats, pressure by
the surrendering mother’s family, advice by the surrendering parent’s physician and
mother, and emotional distress or depression have all been cited as insufficient to
overturn a consent to the surrender of a child for adoption.”); In re Adoption of Baby
Girl K., 615 P.2d at 1315 (“We hold that a lack of full understanding of the consequences, coupled with inexperience, emotional stress, uncertainty and indecisiveness
are insufficient findings to allow repudiation of the surrender.”); see also Appleton,
supra note 11, at 281–82 (discussing adoption revocation cases).
278. Appleton, supra note 11, at 281; see also Kayla P., 2010 WL 987071 (juvenile mother failed to prove undue influence and duress when giving consent even
though she claimed to have not fully read or understood the adoption papers in adoptive parents’ attorney’s office and was not independently represented by counsel); In
re Minor Child David, 256 A.2d at 587–88 (“We conclude that the execution of the
surrender-release is, when all statutory requirements have been met, a completed act
of solemn import, irrevocable by the mother . . . . We arrive at this conclusion fully
aware of the probability that some mothers, experiencing the pain of actual separation
from their children, may regret their surrender even though it was arrived at after
careful deliberation.”); In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d 706 (consent forms were not
executed under duress even though seventeen-year-old minor’s mother told her she
would no longer be able to live at home if she kept the baby); ROBERTS, supra note
165 (discussing the frequency of state interventions in minority families, often including pressure to “voluntarily” terminate parental rights); Mary Lyndon Shanley, Toward New Understandings of Adoption: Individuals and Relationships in Transracial
and Open Adoption, in NOMOS XLIV: CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 15, 38 (Stephen
Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 2003).
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regret has no legal traction because the initial requirement of voluntary consent itself receives only lip service, as illustrated by D.N.T.”279
Strikingly, the revocation cases from private adoption law echo the similarly facile dispatch of voluntary consent requirements in child welfare
law.280 While child welfare law disproportionately impacts racial minority
families and doubly impacts minority adolescent parents within the system,
adoption practices appear to undermine the parental rights of white adolescent
mothers as well.281 Comparing these two areas of law demonstrates that, as a
whole, the law in practice resists granting minors the right to parent their
children, even though in theory minors possess the same parental rights as
adults.
Comparing adoption law to abortion law also yields interesting insights.
The courts’ treatment of regret in adoption law bears a striking contrast to the
use of regret in abortion cases.282 In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court
“makes generalizations about women’s post-abortion regret legally relevant”
and deploys the Court’s conception of abortion regret as a method for “reproaching” non-normative women.283 However, in the adoption context,
women’s (or girls’) post-surrender regret “often carries no such legal
weight.”284 Instead, courts treat the pain of regret as “well-deserved punishment for women who have transgressed prevailing sexual norms.”285 As Professor Appleton persuasively argues, “[A]doption practice and case law often
treat regret as a regulatory device, part of the price of illicit sex and also the
start of the road to redemption.”286 The law’s deployment of regret in this
manner fits within traditional gender scripts and family law’s preoccupation
with sexual discipline.287
The upshot is that the “right” of minor parents to relinquish their children for adoption serves the interest, in some cases, of denying the minor her
rights and imposing a kind of punishment for her sexual transgressions, simi279. Appleton, supra note 11, at 281. “Surely, Camille’s status as a minor and the
surrounding circumstances raise significant questions about the voluntariness and
genuineness of her consent, questions the dissenting judges would find fatal.” Id. at
281.
280. See infra Part II.B.2.
281. See generally FESSLER, supra note 267.
282. Appleton, supra note 11, at 280 (“Despite the similar settings, however, the
legal responses to assertions of regret diverge sharply in the context of abortion, on
one hand, and adoption, on the other.”).
283. Id. (“[N]o legal authority has suggested, parallel to Gonzales’s reasoning,
that prospective regret ought to preclude altogether particular options for birth parents, namely surrender, even if certain anti-adoption support groups might embrace
this preference.”). See generally SOLINGER, supra note 267, at 103–38 (describing
anti-adoption advocacy of Concerned United Birthparents (CUB)).
284. Appleton, supra note 11, at 280.
285. Id. at 282–83.
286. Id. at 283.
287. Id. at 323–32.
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larly to judicial bypass in the abortion context.288 The conflicts in the law on
adolescent adoption versus abortion lie at the surface while at a deeper level,
the conflicting rules serve similar latent purposes: expressing skepticism toward adolescents’ reproductive decision making and punishing teenage girls’
deviations from sexual purity norms.
Other scholars have noted that the conflicting rules on adoption and
abortion appear to be motivated not by “any unified theory of child development, the protection of pregnant teenagers, or the nature and long term effects
of the decisions,” but instead by societal policies, including “the promotion of
live births and control of minors’ sexuality.”289 As currently structured, the
law both thwarts minors’ access to abortion on the basis that adolescent girls
are too immature to make important reproductive decisions on their own, and
undermines minors’ parental rights on the basis that adolescent girls are not
mature enough to parent their children. A closer study of adolescents’ reproductive rights thus demonstrates that both aspects of the law – the law on
abortion rights and parental rights – work in tandem to enforce traditional
gender scripts about sexuality and motherhood.290 In particular, the law reinforces the notion that a self-sacrificing young mother should give birth and
surrender her child for adoption – no matter the emotional costs – as a means
to redemption for her sexually irresponsible behavior.

***
As the analysis in Part II illustrates, there is a striking difference between the rights of minor parents in theory and in reality. A superficial review of the law on adolescent reproduction suggests conflict and incoherence,
restricting teenage girls’ access to abortion while allowing unfettered rights
over childbirth and parenting. A closer look at the reality of minor parents’
parental rights unmasks a perverse coherence to the law. Both abortion law
and family law take a highly skeptical view of adolescents’ rights to make
reproductive decisions, and in practice, the law operates as a means to punish
sexual transgression and enforce traditional gender norms. The judicial bypass system for abortion, the child welfare system, and adoption practices
undermine adolescents’ reproductive rights, whichever path of pregnancy

288. See generally Sanger, Separating from Children, supra note 11 (describing
marginalization of birth mothers in adoption practice).
289. Durcan & Appell, supra note 10, at 77; see also Oberman, Turning Girls Into
Women, supra note 67, at 22; J. Shoshonna Ehrlich, Journey Through the Courts:
Minor Abortion and the Quest for Reproductive Fairness, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
1, 2 (1998).
290. See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 409, 414 (2013) (arguing that rejection of “the idea that women would renounce motherhood given the opportunity to embrace it” drives feelings of abortion
disgust).
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resolution they choose.291 Each of these systems of law claims to serve children’s best interests. Instead, in too many cases, the law merely inflicts
shame and punishment, rather than ensuring sound adolescent decision making and a path to well-being for both generations of children.

III. A THIRD WAY: THIRD PARTY SUPPORT FOR PREGNANT OR
PARENTING ADOLESCENTS
So what are we to do given the law’s suspicion of teenage girls who
transgress sexual norms and end up pregnant or parenting? It may be that
pregnant or parenting adolescents need no special protection, and that we
should advocate for greater legal autonomy, both in theory and in practice.
While this approach has some appeal, this Article argues that it is practically
and politically unachievable. Furthermore, there is significant evidence that
some adolescents would benefit from supportive adult guidance when facing
difficult, consequential decisions.
Adolescents occupy a unique space between childhood and adulthood.292 The debates about youth capacity for sound decision making continue to rage, and the law reflects these debates. Youth law scholars have
extensively dissected the inconsistencies in the law’s treatment of adolescents.293 The growing body of scientific research on child development has
only added fuel to the fire. Science does not provide a simple answer to
questions as to whether or when children might obtain adult-like capacities
for sound decision making. What the scientific research suggests, putting it
all together, is that adolescents’ cognitive functioning is more like that of
adults than of younger children, but adolescents may not exercise “judgment”

291. It is notable that, in contrast to decisions about pregnancy and parenting,
minors can generally access contraception without parental or state involvement. See
supra Part I.A. It may be that preventing teenage pregnancy is generally viewed as a
public health good that, although still controversial, requires access to contraception.
However, once a girl is pregnant, she deserves punishment for her “irresponsible”
decision to have sex and, perhaps, for failing to use contraception.
292. Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 256 (“Adolescence, then, is less a place of
being as it is a place of being in-between.”); Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 556 (“Conventional wisdom about adolescence generally
tracks scientific knowledge about human development--individuals in this group are
proceeding through a developmental stage between childhood and adulthood--they
are neither children nor adults.”). There is some debate about whether adolescence is
a cultural creation, rather than an inevitable biological stage of development. Regardless, in American law there has long been a “conviction that adolescents, despite their
adult-like appearances, were somehow different and in need of adult guidance and
legal protection.” See Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 130.
293. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 277; Jennifer Rosato, What Are the
Implications of Roper’s Dilemma for Adolescent Health Law?, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 167
(2011); Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118.
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in the same manner as adults.294 In other words, adolescents can engage in
rational thought processes but may nevertheless engage in poorer quality
decision making due to age-related tendencies, such as impulsiveness, a focus
on short-term versus long-term consequences, and undue emphasis on appearance and peer approval.295 Thus, although society recognizes that adolescents can engage in adult-like rational thought processes296 and adult-like
biological behaviors, such as sex and reproduction,297 society still feels the
need to protect adolescents from their own poorer quality decision making.
Such concerns are especially salient when the well-being of another generation – the infants of minor parents – depends upon the sound judgment of
responsible parties. Yet, in the context of sexuality and reproduction, society
knows that many teenagers will not or cannot involve parents in their decision making, and that forced parental or governmental involvement does not
always serve either generation of children’s best interests. Given the tension
between the need to make room for adolescents’ growing sense of autonomy
and the desire to provide them with adult guidance in important decisions,
this Part proposes regulatory reforms that involve third parties, other than
parents or the state, in adolescents’ decisions about pregnancy and parenting.
First, this Part summarizes the debates surrounding scientific evidence
on adolescent decision making and its impact on the law. Many scholars
have noted that science does not impart definitive guidance for the law in this
context. Given the strong political resistance to expanding adolescent autonomy in general, this Part suggests solutions beyond the parent/state binary for
providing more effective adult guidance to pregnant or parenting teenagers.
Next, this Part briefly explores possible policy solutions involving third
party adults within the contexts of child welfare, abortion, and adoption law
that would better serve the goals of ensuring sound decision making for teenagers and protecting the well-being of minor parents and their infants. The
solutions I propose aim to value increased adolescent autonomy, to the extent
feasible, and to support adolescents’ reproductive choices whether they
choose abortion, parenting, or adoption. In this Article, “third parties” means
adults other than parents or state officials who have authority over the minor,

294. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1659; see discussion
infra Part III.A.
295. See infra Part III.A.
296. For example, family law custody decisions include adolescents in the decision-making process. Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 289–90 (“[F]amily courts routinely allow or even require that older children participate in decisions about custody,
visitation, and adoption.”).
297. See supra Part II.A (discussing medical treatment exemptions for minors
seeking STI treatment or prenatal care). See also Steve James, Comment, Romeo and
Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call for Reform,
78 UMKC L. REV. 241 (2009) (discussing “Romeo & Juliet” statutory rape exemptions); Chauntelle R. Wood, Romeo and Juliet: The 21st Century Juvenile Sex Offenders, 39 S. U. L. REV. 385 (2012).
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such as judges or child welfare agents.298 Depending on the context, third
parties who might serve as resources for pregnant or parenting minors include
extended family members, neighbors, and community members; health care
professionals; and lawyers acting on behalf of the minor.299 Although private
family law has expanded its understanding of the importance of third party
adults to children’s well being, a similar shift has not been taken up as extensively in child welfare law.300 Similarly, an alternative to parental involvement – judicial bypass – has long been used in abortion law, but it has been
an ineffective and punitive third party alternative.301 More effective third
party solutions could be deployed both in the abortion context and in adoption relinquishment cases – for example, requiring third party counseling in
both circumstances. Such solutions would better align the law in those areas
as well.

A. Science, Politics, and Youth Law: Do Adolescents Need Adult
Guidance?
This Part provides a brief overview of existing scientific data on adolescents’ capacities for sound decision making and the literature on the implications of this scientific evidence for legal policy. Scientific evidence on adolescent decision making appears to be in conflict in some respects, although
scholars have attempted to reconcile the data.302 This Part argues that, given
the scientific uncertainties and political realities surrounding policymaking in
the context of teenage sexuality and reproduction, society must find more
effective solutions to address the dilemma of the gradual maturity of pregnant
or parenting adolescents.
In recent decades, scientific research on adolescent development has
grown exponentially. This science has been used in conflicting ways in legal
298. Private family law’s acknowledgment of the importance of adults who are
not parents, historically referred to as “third parties” or “legal strangers” to the child,
has extended to the point that today, functioning in a parent-like role can lead to becoming a parent. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents By the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 11, 19, 25–26 (2008); see also Manian, supra note 94, at 246–47 (summarizing law and literature on private family law’s increasing recognition of third parties in
family life). Although it remains clear that only parents possess the constitutional
right to control their children’s upbringing, the question of who counts as a parent has
become increasingly complex. See generally Appleton, supra; Manian, supra note
94.
299. I do not attempt a detailed analysis of reform proposals incorporating third
parties in this last Part. Instead, I aim to sketch out the idea generally and urge a
conversation about how to create space for adolescence in the law by providing options between the extremes of adolescent autonomy versus subjection to the authority
of parent and state.
300. See Manian, supra note 94, at 247.
301. See id. at 245.
302. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1609.
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advocacy. Research in developmental psychology has shown that adolescents as young as fourteen have cognitive abilities similar to adults.303 Advocates for abortion rights have relied on this research to argue that minors
should not be required to obtain parental or judicial consent prior to obtaining
abortion care.304 In contrast, other areas of research, such as neuroscience,
suggest that adolescents differ in fundamental ways in the quality of their
decision making.305 Advocates for youth within the context of juvenile crime
303. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment: A
Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 423 (1978); David G. Scherer,
The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical Treatment Decisions,
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431, 436 (1991); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell,
The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions,
53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595–96 (1982). See generally Mutcherson, supra note 5, at
935–39 (discussing research on adolescent decision-making capacity in healthcare
contexts); Rosato, supra note 293, at 177–79.
304. See generally Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 938–41 (discussing abortion
rights advocates use of scientific evidence to argue for adolescent autonomy in abortion decision making and noting that “[t]here is a significant body of literature that
stands for the proposition that young women are, in fact, largely capable of making
decisions about terminating a pregnancy without the assistance of their parents”). See
also Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents’ Psychological & Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
129, 140–42 (1992) (study indicated no difference between adolescents and adults
considering abortion); Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors’ and Adults’
Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446, 446–51 (1980) (study of a
small group of adults and adolescents awaiting pregnancy results found few age related differences). The American Psychological Association has submitted multiple
briefs to the Supreme Court supporting the right of pregnant teenagers to make abortion decisions, as well as issuing a policy statement supportive of adolescent abortion
rights. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1607–08 n.3, 1630 n.91;
Interdivisional Comm. on Adolescent Abortion, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological
and Legal Issues, 42 AM. PSYCHO. 73 (1987).
305. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2455 (2012) (imposing mandatory
life imprisonment without parole sentences for minors under the age of eighteen at the
time of their crimes, including crimes involving homicide, violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (holding that imposing life without parole on a juvenile
offender for non-homicide crimes violates the 8th Amendment, and relying explicitly
on “developments in psychology and brain science [that] continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
551, 569–70 (2005) (holding that juveniles cannot be subject to the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment, and discussing scientific evidence, including recent
neuroscience research, on adolescent decision making and implications for adolescents’ lesser criminal culpability). See Rosato, supra note 293, at 169–77 (discussing
recent neuroscience literature on adolescent brain development and the Roper and
Graham decisions); Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives from Brain and Behavioral Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 55,
55 (2007); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty By Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
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have relied on this research to argue that minors should not be subject to the
death penalty or life without parole and, generally, that adolescents are less
culpable in the criminal context.306 The Supreme Court has struggled in both
areas of youth law to incorporate the scientific evidence on child development and balance the interests of adolescents, their parents, and the state.307
In both abortion and juvenile criminal law decisions, the Supreme Court has
consistently taken the view of young people as “flawed and generally immature whether they are committing capital crimes or seeking to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy.”308
Scholars have also examined the tensions within the law created by the
scientific evidence and conflicting advocacy positions.309 Part of the difficulty in reconciling the scientific evidence and varying policy positions in the
healthcare versus criminal contexts lies in the concept of “competence,”
which does not have a simple definition.310 Elizabeth Scott has argued that
the studies on adolescent competence in the healthcare context have overly

Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011 (2003); see also Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 938–53 (summarizing literature on adolescent capacity for decisionmaking in criminal law context); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution
of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 138 (1998).
306. See Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 942–53 (discussing strategies of advocates
for youth in the context of the juvenile criminal system).
307. See Bellotti v. Baird (Belotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 635–36 (1979) (plurality
opinion); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482–83; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper,
543 U.S. at 569. See generally, Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 939–54 (discussing
Supreme Court decisions on minors access to abortion care and juvenile criminal
culpability).
308. Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 954 (discussing Supreme Court decisions on
minors access to abortion care and juvenile criminal culpability).
309. For example, Professor Kimberly Mutcherson argues that the positions of
advocates for youth who argue that adolescents are competent to make decisions
about abortion, but not culpable in the same manner as adults for criminal acts, do
contain an underlying consistency. Id. at 929. She explains that the context of decision-making, i.e., formal versus informal settings, affects the quality of decisionmaking. See id. at 958–64. Therefore, “it is logical to conclude that the decisionmaking process in formal healthcare settings lead to better decisions that the law
should support than is the case in the informal settings in which young people decide
to participate in criminal activities.” Id. at 929. Others have also taken this contextual view of adolescent decision-making capacity. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 114, at
108–14; Rosato, supra note 293, at 179–81; Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 592 (2009).
310. Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 929–34 (discussing definitions of competence
or capacity for decision making in healthcare, lawyer-client, and criminal law settings); see also Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1146 (2011) (discussing related concept of “maturity” and arguing that maturity is a cultured concept
rather than a scientific one).
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focused on the informed consent doctrine and thus, have excluded other important factors in decision making:
[I]nformed consent doctrine has shaped the discourse and provided the
standard for comparing the capabilities of minors with those of adults.
This framework for assessing competence focuses on two aspects of
cognitive functioning: the capacity for understanding and the capacity
for reasoning. The doctrine, and thus the framework, exclude inquiry
into aspects of decisionmaking [sic] that have to do with the quality of
judgment; an inclination to make “poor” choices does not signify incompetence under informed consent tests.311

Professor Scott’s distinction between cognitive abilities and abilities to
exercise sound judgment is useful for understanding the conflicting uses of
scientific research on adolescent decision making in the law. While the studies focused on cognitive abilities show that by age fourteen, many adolescents have adult-like cognitive functioning, other studies focusing on psychosocial development and more recent neuroscience research suggest that adolescents may nevertheless have poorer decision-making outcomes.312 Thus,
the scientific research supports two different kinds of intuitions: that adolescents are more advanced in their reasoning abilities than younger children but
also less advanced than adults in the quality of their decision making. In particular, adolescents differ from adults in attitude toward risk, in impulsiveness, in greater weight attached to short-term rather than long-term consequences, and in the importance attached to personal appearance and peer influence.313
In addition, although there is “unassailable evidence that adolescents do
not act or think like young children,” Professor Scott argues that the tests of
cognitive ability alone are unpersuasive to policymakers “because [they] do[]

311. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1609 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). For example, in the healthcare context, studies have found that
“minors aged 14 years and higher make decisions regarding the waiver of rights or
consent to medical procedures in generally the same manner that adults do;” however,
researchers have noted that this research also “need[s] to consider judgment factors
(e.g., consideration of social consequences) as well as cognitive and reasoning ability
in determining adolescents’ legal capacities.” Preston A. Britner et al., Evaluating
Juveniles’ Competence to Make Abortion Decisions: How Social Science Can Inform
the Law, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 46 (1998). See also Oberman, Minor
Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 134 (“[A]dolescents experience a chronic
disjuncture caused by varying levels of biological development, cognitive ability, and
experiential knowledge. Rather than mistaking one of these markers, such as cognitive ability, as indicative of adult-like capacity, the health care system’s response to
adolescents should reflect our awareness of this disjuncture.”).
312. See Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1622–42.
313. Id. at 1642 n.126, 1643–47.
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not respond to important concerns underlying paternalistic policies.”314 In
particular, with regard to minors, society cares not only about whether they
engage in rational processes of decision making, but also whether they are
capable of exercising good judgment such that the results of their decisions
are good ones.315 For example, Professor Scott notes that “few would argue,
on ‘competence’ grounds, that twelve year olds who can pass the legally required written and performance tests should be awarded a license to drive a
motor vehicle.”316 From the perspective of the public and policymakers,
“Protecting minors from the harm that can result from their own poor judgment seems important in order to preserve the options of youthful decision
makers for a future when it is presumed, they will make sounder choices.”317
Thus, despite evidence on the adult-like cognitive abilities of adolescents,
“resistance to reformulating the premises of legal policy toward children is
formidable.”318 Professor Scott concludes, “The paternalistic goal of protecting minors and society from the costs of immature judgment is an even more
powerful constraint on initiatives to extend adolescent self-determination than
is usually acknowledged.”319
In a similar vein, Jennifer Rosato emphasizes that even as neuroscience
and other disciplines develop more research on the adolescent brain, “core
values underlying public policies, not science, ultimately will help resolve
this dilemma” on the law’s approach to adolescent capacity and culpability in
314. See id. at 1610. See also Lois Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal
Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 25, 25–50 (N. Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984) (discussing legal standards of competency in various contexts
and applicability of psychological studies on capacity evaluations for minors).
315. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1656 (“Moreover, if the
values that drive risky choices are associated with youth, and predictably will change
with maturity, then our paternalistic inclination is to protect the young decisionmaker—and ourselves—from his or her bad judgment. This impulse is not quelled by the
knowledge that, in making the ‘poor’ decision, the youthful decisionmaker has engaged in a rational process.”).
316. Id. at 1638. Even if some adolescents have adult-like abilities in their decision-making, evidence suggests that teenagers “have widely varying levels of competency that depend not only on their biological stage of development, but also on their
life experience.” Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 133. Research establishing the onset of adult-like cognitive functioning for older adolescents
“also indicates that these abilities are acquired gradually, and that they reflect both a
biological and an environmental component.” See id. Scholars generally agree that
“maturity occurs on a continuum.” Todres, supra note 310, at 1161.
317. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning, supra note 118, at 1639.
318. Id. at 1612.
319. Id.; see also Emily Buss, What the Law Should (And Should Not) Learn from
Child Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 44 (2009) [hereinafter Buss,
What the Law Should (And Should Not) Learn] (noting that focusing solely on children’s developmental capacities “runs the risk of failing to account from some of the
real reasons we support special rights and protections for children,” such as an opportunity to learn how exercise their rights well).
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various contexts.320 Of course, what these values should be remain hotly
debated, particularly around abortion. Several other scholars also argue that
tying law to developmental theories about children raises numerous risks,
including serious questions about the reliability of recent scientific evidence,
how science should be translated into legal policy, and how legal rules themselves affect child development.321
Given the scientific uncertainties surrounding adolescent development
and the public’s strong intuition that adolescents make decisions differently
than adults, it remains extremely difficult to convince the public in general
and state officials in particular that adolescents should have a right to make
autonomous decisions in any arena, and particularly in controversial areas
related to sexuality, reproduction, and teenage parenting.322 Rather than ignoring adolescence as a distinct category between childhood and adulthood,
the law could acknowledge adolescence as an in-between status – neither
child nor adult – by seeking solutions between the parent/state binary, and in
particular solutions that are supportive of adolescents’ sexual and reproductive decisions rather than punitive. The next Part briefly sketches out possibilities for reform and urges further conversation along these lines.

B. Third Parties in Private Family Law and Possibilities for Reform
Policy solutions involving third party adults could accommodate both
scientific evidence and popular intuitions about adolescents’ need for adult
guidance, while also supporting adolescents’ reproductive decision making
whether they seek to terminate a pregnancy, parent their infants, or relinquish
for adoption. It is important to reiterate that I am not arguing that teenage
parents should have no oversight whatsoever. Expanding the list of kinds of
adults who might become involved with pregnant or parenting youth’s decision making could provide more effective oversight. We could establish interventions that provide pregnant or parenting teenagers with support from
trusted third party adults in situations where now, those adolescents must
either submit to parental or state authorities who might undermine the adolescents’ reproductive decisions or are given no support until a crisis occurs. A
third party approach could also assist those adolescents who would benefit
from adult counsel while avoiding the potential harms of enforced parental or

320. Rosato, supra note 293, at 171; see also Scott, The Legal Construction of
Adolescence, supra note 1, at 564 (discussing the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and
noting that “legal childhood and adulthood are social and political constructs, rather
than simply products of scientific understanding of human development”).
321. See Clare Huntington, Neuroscience and the Child Welfare System, 21
BROOKLYN J. L. & POL’Y 37, 52–57 (2012) (discussing potential concerns with relying on neuroscience for developing child welfare policy); Buss, What the Law Should
(And Should Not) Learn, supra note 319, at 53.
322. Id. at 56.
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state involvement in the sensitive arena of adolescent sexuality and reproduction.323
A number of scholars and researchers have noted that third parties could
help to ensure sound decision making for adolescents.324 For example, in the
healthcare context, Jennifer Rosato argues that given individual variation in
development, healthcare providers should be permitted to assess a minor’s
maturity and, if appropriate, provide care as the minor wishes without involving a parent.325 In a similar vein, Kimberly Mutcherson argues for a model of
shared decision making between adolescents and parents in the healthcare
context.326 Her model would allow exceptions from shared adolescent-parent
healthcare decision making if an adolescent does not wish to include a parent,
such as in decisions about abortion care.327 Dean Rosato and Professor
Mutcherson essentially argue for a third party solution with regard to sexual
and reproductive healthcare, with the healthcare provider serving as the thirdparty adult advisor.328 As Franklin Zimring argued in his seminal work, adolescence could be treated as a period of “semi-autonomy,” and youths should
be given the freedom to make choices in a protective setting, so that they
have a kind of “learners permit” for full participation in society.329
Who that third party should be will vary by the context. A thorough
analysis of various kinds of third party interventions, as well as their pros and
cons, is beyond the scope of this Article. Below, this Part explores a few
possibilities for legal reform involving third party adults who could more
effectively support pregnant or parenting minors. While requiring involvement of third party adults does not grant adolescents full autonomy, these
proposals aim to value teenagers’ own reproductive decisions and support
their choices whether they seek abortion care, to maintain the (minor) parentchild bond, or to relinquish their infant for adoption. These recommendations
are made tentatively and with the understanding that third party solutions may
323. See Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 300–24.
324. See Steinberg et al., supra note 309, at 586–87, 592–93 (emphasis added)

(“[W]here emotional and social influences on judgment are minimized or can be mitigated, and where there are consultants who can provide objective information about
the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, adolescents are likely to be just
as capable of mature decision making as adults, at least by the time they are 16.”).
325. See Rosato, supra note 293, at 181–89.
326. See Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 300–24.
327. Id. at 304; see also Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 963–64 (“Though there may
be disagreement about how to interpret available science, it is indisputable that there
are consequential differences between adults and adolescents when it comes to making decisions. . . . A young person’s decision-making skills can be enhanced when
coupled with opportunities to engage with responsible adults before making a decision whereas the deficiencies in adolescent decision-making are brought painfully to
light in other circumstances that play to the weakest elements of the adolescent experience.”).
328. Mutcherson, supra note 27, at 301; Rosato, supra note 293, at 179–81.
329. FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 89–
101 (1982).
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be expensive, politically charged, difficult to implement, and bear risks of
their own. Nonetheless, it is important to generate a conversation in this direction. More openness to incorporating third party adults into adolescent
decision making on reproduction and parenting could potentially benefit
many struggling adolescents.
First, with regard to child welfare law, the expansion of third party
rights in private family law suggests models for incorporating third parties
into public family law in ways that would support the minor parent-child
relationship, even if the minor parent cannot care for her infant.330 In private
family law, as many scholars have noted, parental rights have become disaggregated in numerous ways. The rise of joint custody and corresponding
emphasis on “shared parenting” and growing recognition of functional parents all indicate a move away from an “all or nothing” approach to
parenthood.331 In contrast, in public family law, the “all or nothing” approach
still prevails.332 If abuse or neglect has occurred, advocates for minor parents
should focus on obtaining appropriate services for the minor so that she can
exit the child welfare system with her parental rights intact.333 For those adolescent parents who cannot maintain custody of their children, the law could
look to alternatives that allow the minor parent to maintain a relationship with
her infant, even though the infant’s primary custody may be transferred to a
third party non-parent adult. Options like subsidized guardianship and open
adoption could allow for an ongoing relationship between the minor parent
and her infant, while also providing appropriate care for the infant.334 Yet, in
child welfare law, the dyadic parental model still dominates over a triadic
model.335 Placements incorporating third party adults into the minor parent’s

330. Private family law refers to disputes in the context of the private distribution
of wealth and child custody determinations that do not involve public benefits; public
family law concerns state public benefits systems, including the child welfare system,
which primarily affects poor families. See Gosdoe, supra note 155, at 116. See generally How the Child Welfare System Works, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (May
2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/cpswork.pdf.
331. See Manian, supra note 94 (summarizing recent trends to recognize children’s relationships with third party adults in private family law).
332. See Godsoe, supra note 155, at 170 (arguing that child welfare should parse
out parenthood in public families in the same way as in private families).
333. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 45.
334. Godsoe, supra note 155, at 145–48 (discussing subsidized guardianship as
reform with potential to solve some of the underlying problems of the child welfare
system); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 1, 17 (2013) (discussing the possibilities of open adoption arrangements in the
child welfare system). In the context of subsidized guardianship or open adoption,
the minor parents’ parent (grandparent) could serve as the guardian or adoptive parent. Id. at 14. These options may be preferable since the grandparent would not have
to terminate his or her own child’s parental rights to assist with the care and custody
of the grandchild. Id.
335. Godsoe, supra note 155, at 146.
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relationship with her infant remain underutilized in favor of the traditional
path of termination of parental rights and closed adoption.336
Third party guardianship or custodial placements that allow for the minor parent to continue her parental relationship present a better alternative
than termination of parental rights, but these options typically come too late.
Even more importantly, we need to emphasize policy solutions to prevent
abuse or neglect by minor parents.337 Supportive adult guidance in the form
of a third party adult mentor presents one promising type of third party early
intervention.338 An extensive literature on the benefits of adult mentoring for
at-risk youth indicates that third party adult support can improve outcomes
for teenage mothers and their infants.339 Numerous studies on various forms
336. See Cynthia Godsoe, Permanency Puzzle, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1113,
1120 (describing underutilization of subsidized guardianship and open adoption in
child welfare law).
337. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW FAMILY LAW
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 93 (2014) (describing how child welfare law
“suffers from a fundamental misorientation” away from prevention and instead to
“wait for a crisis and then intervene in a heavy-handed manner”). A number of scholars have advocated a public health approach to child welfare, which focuses on evidence based identification of risk factors and interventions to prevent child maltreatment. See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 86, 174–81; Annette Appell, The Myth of
Separation, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 291, 298 (2011); Marsha Garrison, Reforming
Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 590, 599
(2005); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Toward a Public Health Legal Structure for Child Welfare, 92 NEB. L. REV. 897, 899 (2014). As numerous scholars of child welfare law
have noted, best practices for minor parents should include interventions that avoid
teenage parents being charged with abuse or neglect at the outset. Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 168, at 45. Early intervention is particularly important for minor
parents who are already wards of the state:
Parenting wards present a crucial point of intervention in the foster care cycle.
Failure to meet the needs of this population places both the foster youth and
their children at increased risk of homelessness and poverty, and sets the stage
for yet another generation of children to be removed from their parents and
raised by the state.

Id. at 7.
338. See Godsoe, supra note 336, at 1134 (noting mentoring programs as potentially useful intervention for youth in foster care).
339. See Cynthia L. Sipe, Mentoring Programs for Adolescents: A Research
Summary, 31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 251, 251–60 (2002) (summarizing research on
youth mentoring programs from the mid-1980s through the late-1990s). The research
has focused on various issues such as documenting the benefits of mentoring, analyzing the nature of mentoring relationships and the practices of effective mentors, and
defining best practices for programs. See id. Generally, the literature defines “mentors” as persons who deliberately “support, guide, and shape individuals younger or
less experienced than themselves as they weather difficult periods, enter new arenas,
or undertake challenging tasks.” Antronette K. Yancey et al., Role Modeling, Risk,
and Resilience in California Adolescents, 48 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 36, 37 (2011).
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of mentoring as an intervention for pregnant and parenting teenagers have
indicated positive effects.340 Researchers have concluded that “it appears that
guidance and support from an adult outside of the home can be extremely
influential in the lives of young mothers.”341 For example, the Nurse-Family
Mentors do not include peers or romantic partners, but nonparent relatives can serve
as mentors. See Elena L. Klaw et al., Natural Mentors in the Lives of African American Adolescent Mothers: Tracking Relationships Over Time, 32 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 223, 226 (2003). In addition to formal mentors assigned through mentoring programs, youth report nonparent-mentoring relationships with extended family members (e.g., grandparents and aunts/uncles), adults in professional roles (e.g.,
teachers, guidance counselors, and ministers), and adults in more informal capacities
(e.g., coaches, friends’ parents, and co-workers). See id. at 231.
340. See Klaw et al., supra note 339, at 231. For example, one study of a homebased formal mentoring program found that formal mentors were effective in preventing rapid repeat births among the study participants, who were all low-income, African American adolescent mothers living with their mothers (the infants’ grandmothers). Maureen M. Black et al., Delaying Second Births Among Adolescent Mothers: A
Randomized, Controlled Trial of a Home-Based Mentoring Program, 118 PEDIATRICS
1087, 1096 (2006). The study authors hypothesized that since mentoring “operates
through the formation of a relationship that enable participants to look to the mentor
for support,” it would be an ideal intervention for preventing rapid second births. Id.
at 1096–98. The authors noted the limits of the study, including the small number of
participants and the difficulty of determining whether those who participated were
more motivated to avoid second births in the first place, but nevertheless concluded
that the “findings suggest that a mentorship model that includes structured intervention, along with a strong focus on building a supportive relationship, may be an effective strategy in reducing second births.” Id. at 1097.
341. See Klaw et al., supra note 339, at 230. Researchers have also studied the
protective influence of natural mentors (as opposed to formal mentors assigned
through a program), such as special aunts, neighbors, or teachers, on pregnant and
parenting teenagers. Id. at 223. Several studies focusing on African-American teenagers concluded that natural mentors are an important resource for adolescent mothers. Id. at 231. One study suggested that natural mentors may help to improve the
career development of pregnant and parenting African-American adolescents. Elena
L. Klaw & Jean E. Rhodes, Mentor Relationships and the Career Development of
Pregnant and Parenting African-American Teenagers, 19 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 551,
551 (1995). The results of the study provided “further evidence that natural mentors
are an important protective resource for pregnant and parenting, African-American
adolescents.” Id. at 558. The authors concluded that the study results have important
implications for interventions with young women of color. Id. at 560. The study
provides “indirect evidence for the potential value of programs that pair volunteer
mentors with at-risk adolescents,” since, like natural mentors, volunteer adult mentors
may be able to offer at-risk youth protection against the many stressors in their lives.
Id. Although the study findings are limited, the authors emphasized that “we should
not minimize the potentially protective influence of natural mentors in the lives of
inner-city teenagers.” Id. Similarly, another study on natural mentors in the lives of
African-American adolescent mothers found that adolescents with mentor relationships over the course of two years were more likely to have remained in school or
graduated than those without mentors. Klaw et al., supra note 339, at 223. Ultimate-
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Partnership, which involves intensive home visits by a nurse during a mother’s pregnancy and for the following two years, has shown that third party
adult intervention can lead to demonstrably positive results.342 Importantly,
researchers have emphasized, “By relying on nonparents adults, adolescent
mothers can gain some autonomy while simultaneously obtaining much
needed emotional support and advice.”343 In sum, the literature on the benefits of nonparent adult mentoring for adolescents reinforces the notion that
third party adults can provide effective support for pregnant and parenting
teenagers.344
Obviously, mentoring programs and other solutions incorporating third
party adults into the minor parent-child relationship, such as subsidized
guardianship and open adoption, do not provide a panacea for the many ills of
the child welfare system. The child welfare system is extremely complicated,
and no single simple solution can address its myriad problems. The wellbeing of pregnant and parenting adolescents also strongly depends on other
resources, such as adequate healthcare, child care, housing, and educational

ly, the study findings suggested that the support of an enduring natural mentor may
help facilitate young mothers’ school retention and completion. See id. at 229–31.
342. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 337, at 187–90.
343. Klaw & Rhodes, supra note 341, at 552.
344. The literature overall suggests benefits to mentoring adolescent mothers over
time. Klaw et al., supra note 339, at 230. Furthermore, despite several studies’ focus
on natural mentors, researchers have noted that many adolescent mothers have no
such support in their lives, and therefore, providing young mothers with volunteer
mentors may be a beneficial intervention: “Skillful, persistent volunteers could potentially earn the trust of adolescent mothers and offer adolescents some of the benefits
that natural mentors seem to afford.” Id. at 231. Another study found that AfricanAmerican adolescent mothers who identified natural mentors (defined as a supportive
non-parent or non-peer) derived more benefits from their social networks and reported lower levels of depression than similar youth without a mentor. See Jean E.
Rhodes et al., Natural Mentors: An Overlooked Resource in the Social Networks of
Young, African American Mothers, 20 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 445, 445 (1992).
One intervention study based on the principles of mentorship indicated that intensive
home visitation by nursing paraprofessionals indigenous to the community may be
effective in reducing infant mortality, low birthweight, and child maltreatment within
a sample of high-risk, low-income, urban-residing adolescents. See Linda Flynn, The
Adolescent Parenting Program: Improving Outcomes Through Mentorship, 16 PUB.
HEALTH NURSING 182, 188 (1999). A study examining factors affecting drinking
patterns of pregnant adolescents found that those who identified either nonparent
mentors and/or parents who provided high levels of support were less likely to have
consumed alcohol during pregnancy. See Jean E. Rhodes et al., Risk and Protective
Factors for Alcohol Use Among Pregnant African-American, Hispanic, and White
Adolescents: The Influence of Peers, Sexual Partners, Family Members, and Mentors,
19 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 555, 555 (1994). Reports of mentors’ protective qualities
are also corroborated by the literature on resilience, which has highlighted the positive influence of nonparental adults in the lives of at-risk children and adolescents.
Klaw & Rhodes, supra note 341, at 552.
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and employment opportunities.345 Thinking about solutions that look to third
party adults to assist minor parents in their parenting, rather than heavyhanded state intervention, represents just one move in the right direction to
provide substance to minors’ parental rights. Third party adult support could
help to ensure that minor parents in the system can maintain a parental relationship with their children if they wish, and most importantly, this support
can help to keep minor parents and their infants out of the child welfare system in the first place.346
Second, with regard to the abortion and adoption contexts, providing
pregnant or parenting teenagers with the option to seek guidance from third
party adults offers much promise for more effective protection of adolescents’
well-being.347 I have argued elsewhere that developments in private family
law bolster the case for amending statutes requiring parental involvement
with abortion to allow teenagers to consult with designated adults other than
parents or judges.348 In particular, private family law’s increasing recognition
of the importance of non-parent third party adults in children’s lives buttresses calls for reformulating parental involvement legislation to permit adolescent girls to obtain consent from trusted adults other than parents and in lieu
of a formal judicial interrogation.349 As in the abortion context, we should
consider whether adult support – and what kinds of adult support – would
better serve the well-being of minor parents considering relinquishment of
their infant for adoption. Regulatory reform of both abortion and adoption
law to include involvement by third party non-parent, non-state adults, would
also make for a more obviously coherent body of law on pregnant teenagers
who choose to avoid parenting either through abortion or adoption.350 Re345. Klaw & Rhodes, supra note 341, at 560.
346. For example,
Research indicates that involvement of adults with teen parents improves decision-making and outcomes. In fact, one of the most important variables in
determining whether a teen mother will become the respondent in an abuse
and neglect action tends to be her living situation. Adolescent mothers living
with an adult relative were much less likely to have their children removed for
abuse and neglect than those who were not living with an adult relative.

Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 330 (citing Patricia Flanagan et al., Predicting Maltreatment of Children of Teenage Mothers, 149 PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED.
451, 451–55 (1995)). Of course, sometimes the involvement of relatives can be detrimental rather than helpful. Id. (noting that attorneys should be watchful of the involvement of relatives of minor parents in child welfare proceedings if the family
members are not supporting or are interfering with the client’s decision making).
347. See Manian, supra note 94, at 241.
348. See id. at 246–51.
349. See id. at 246.
350. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 134–46 (arguing that similarities between
abortion and adoption decisions calls for alignment of the law on minors’ decision
making in these contexts).
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forms looking to third parties could also more effectively serve the law’s
purported goal of ensuring sound decision making for pregnant teenagers
choosing abortion or adoption, rather than surreptitiously operating as a
means of punishment.351
For example, perhaps offering adolescents who are considering either
abortion or adoption relinquishment a menu of options to choose from in
terms of seeking adult guidance in their decision making would grant adolescents some autonomy while still ensuring adult oversight. In the abortion
context, states could allow teenage girls to choose between involving a parent, an adult family member, a counselor, or a judge prior to receiving abortion care. Scholars have proposed such reforms to parental involvement legislation, and a few states have adopted laws that allow for third parties other
than judges to approve adolescent girls’ abortion care.352
Similarly, adoption law could provide a list of adults that a minor parent
choosing relinquishment would consult prior to a final consent to relinquishment. Birth parent advocates, scholars, and courts have argued for various
kinds of adoption law reforms, particularly for minor parents consenting to
voluntary relinquishment. Adoption case law and literature suggest that
mandatory parental or judicial involvement in minor parents’ relinquishment
decisions could present many of the same problems of shaming and imposition of the adults’ own normative judgments as in the abortion context.353
While mandatory parental or judicial approval may prove arbitrary, the ab351. See Samuels, supra note 208, at 509 (arguing that adoption law generally
fails to promote its stated goal of ensuring birth mothers’ informed decision making
with respect to relinquishment for adoption).
352. See Manian, supra note 94, at 246–51.
353. As with abortion decisions, parents or judges could coerce the minor to conform to the adults’ own normative view of the correct decision rather than supporting
and guiding the minor’s decision-making process. Some revocation cases indicate
that family members have put pressure on teenagers to consent to relinquish their
infant. See, e.g., Adoption of J.M.M. v. New Beginnings of Tupelo, Inc., 796 So. 2d
975, 983 (Miss. 2001) (denying revocation of adoption decree even though facts indicated sixteen-year-old mother was pressured into consenting by her parents);
Gaughan v. Gilliam, 401 N.W.2d 687 (Neb. 1987) (holding that mere fact that birth
mother might be pressured by friends or family does not amount to “undue influence”
sufficient to invalidate her relinquishment for the child even when birth mother is
sixteen years old). Similarly, requiring judicial approval for a minor parent’s consent
to relinquishment may result in unwarranted scrutiny, rather than skilled and unbiased
counseling toward a decision that serves the well-being of the minor parent and her
infant. See Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.11[2] (“Risks are posed, however, even
by this [court process for voluntary relinquishment]. Not the least of these is that the
biological mother’s resolve to relinquish her child could be subject to extensive and
inappropriate scrutiny.”). Of course, some birth mothers may also feel pressure not to
relinquish their infants for adoption. See Kyle Wier, Promoting Adoption as a Solution to Teen Pregnancy: A Study and Model, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 319 (2003) (conducting small study of teen mothers in a group home and finding various pressures for
teen parents to select child rearing over adoption).
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sence of any adult guidance in some cases leaves the minor parent vulnerable
to coercive influence from others, as the revocation case law demonstrates.
Instead of enforced parental or judicial involvement prior to relinquishment, the law could also give minors the option of seeking professional counseling or independent legal representation, along with procedural reforms,
such as longer time frames post-birth for obtaining consent for relinquishment.354 As in abortion law, counseling by health care professionals could
serve as a more effective means of supporting sound decision making than a
judicial interrogation.355 In addition, adoption law critics often suggest inde354. “Reforming the law to give birth mothers more time to change their minds or
ensure them legal counsel, as some have proposed, could help reshape the emotional
landscape.” Appleton, supra note 11, at 285 (citing Janet G. v. N.Y. Foundling
Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646, 651 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978)); Samuels, supra note 208, at
509.
355. Of course, requiring independent counseling and the waiting periods that
typically go along with such counseling in the adoption context would echo standard
techniques of anti-abortion advocacy. Caitlin Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 291, 291 (2010) (discussing the “undue burden” of abortion regulations, including waiting periods, “informed consent” and independent counseling, as “physical,
familial, and spiritual invasions of women’s privacy”). If such requirements make
sense in adoption law, then those opposed to abortion might argue, why not also in
abortion law? In other words, can advocates for minors’ reproductive rights coherently argue in favor of counseling and waiting periods in adoption law while resisting
such requirements in abortion law? One argument is that more involvement by third
party adults might be needed in the adoption context than in the abortion context. In
abortion care, the physician is already obligated to ensure the patient’s informed consent and can serve as third party support for the minor. See Mutcherson, supra note
27, at 304 (arguing that health care provider can serve as third party adult advisor for
minor seeking abortion care). In adoption law, the minor parent may have no one to
represent her interests. Adoption is also legally more complicated, particularly given
the confusion surrounding open adoption and the number of revocation cases where
false promises of ongoing visitation have induced birth mothers to relinquish their
children and led to revocation disputes. See, e.g., In re S.O., 795 P.2d 254, 254 (Colo. 1990) (holding that biological mother and stepfather’s unenforceable and false
promise of visitation rights did not constitute fraud sufficient to invalidate the consent); In re Adoption of J.H.G., 869 P.2d 640, 648–49 (Kan. 1994) (holding that birth
mother failed to establish that adoptive parents had fraudulently promised that she
would have post-adoption visitation); In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690, 711–
12 (Miss. 2003) (denying minors’ request for revocation of consent despite facts
showing minor parent was denied promise of visitation); Kathleen G. v. Saint Lawrence Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 565 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that birth mother would be held to her voluntary surrender of child even though
she had mistaken belief she would be entitled to visitation); see also Thompson &
Hollinger, supra note 231, at § 8.02 [1][b] (“[A] biological parent’s mistake regarding
the effect of the consent will not be a ground for revocation, particularly where the
effect of the consent was explained.”). Nevertheless, given political resistance to
abortion rights, it might be most feasible to seek statutory reforms requiring that independent counseling professionals guide teenage decision making in both the abortion
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pendent legal representation for birth parents as a crucially needed reform,
especially for minor parents.356 Many states permit out-of-court consents to
be executed before a notary public or even the attorney representing the prospective adoptive parents – procedures that are “often criticized as providing
insufficient evidence that the parent executing the consent or relinquishment
did so knowingly and voluntarily.”357 Adoption law experts have long suggested independent legal representation for minor parents considering executing a voluntary consent for adoption.358 Particularly given the complexity of
open adoption, the current form of many if not most domestic adoptions, 359
minor parents would likely benefit from independent legal counsel who could
accurately describe their rights post-adoption.360

and adoption contexts. See Manian, supra note 94, at 251 (arguing that third party
counseling would be better compromise than judicial bypass, particularly given political resistance to adolescent abortion rights).
356. Vivek S. Sankaran, A Hidden Crisis: The Need to Strengthen Representation
of Parents in Child Protective Proceeding, 89 MICH. B. J. 36, 37 (2010) [hereinafter
Sankaran, A Hidden Crisis] (“A national consensus is emerging that zealous legal
representation of parents is crucial in ensuring that the child welfare system produces
just outcomes for children.”). Studies show that when parents have the right to counsel hearings are faster saving millions of dollars to the government. Vivek S. Sankaran, Protecting a Parent’s Right to Counsel in Child Welfare Cases, 13 MICH. CHILD
WELFARE L. J. 2, 3 (2009); see also Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 317 (“Children
need legal counsel when making the decision to relinquish their infant or when facing
termination of parental rights.”).
357. Hollinger, supra note 79, at § 2.11[2]; cf. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-405(a)(4)
(1994) (“A consent or relinquishment executed by a parent or guardian must be
signed or confirmed in the presence of . . . a lawyer other than a lawyer who is representing an adoptive parent or the agency to which a minor is relinquished . . . .”).
358. For example, the Uniform Adoption Act provides that “[a] parent who is a
minor is competent to execute a consent or relinquishment if the parent has had access
to counseling and has had the advice of a lawyer who is not representing an adoptive
parent or the agency to which the parent’s child is relinquished.” UNIF. ADOPTION
ACT § 2-405(c). Ideally, best practices for minor parents considering placing their
infants for adoption should incorporate all of these suggestions for reform: sufficient
time post-birth to make a final decision; skilled and unbiased counseling from trained
professionals unaffiliated with adoptive parents or agencies; and independent legal
counsel to provide adequate advice on the legal consequences of adoption. See Samuels, supra note 208, at 566–72 (summarizing best practices for voluntary relinquishments regardless of age of the birth parent).
359. Open adoption is commonplace today in the United States. See Gaddie,
supra note 227; Appell, supra note 227, at 4. Although open adoption has potential
pitfalls, “evidence indicates that open adoption has decreased some of the negative
emotions that birth parents once felt in closed adoptions.” Appleton, supra note 11, at
320.
360. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 151–53 (arguing that legal complexity of
adoption adds additional reason to grant minor parents special protections that may be
unnecessary for minors seeking abortion care).
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Of course, adequate counseling and legal advice do not provide a silver
bullet for the variety of concerns surrounding minor parents’ relinquishments,
particularly given the ethical complexities involved when lawyers represent
minors.361 There is an extensive literature debating the lawyers’ role in representing adolescents and children.362 In many cases, it remains uncertain
whether the lawyer should represent the minors’ expressed wishes or determine the best interests for the minor. In the case of minor parents, the best
interests of both generations of children must be considered, complicating
matters further.

361. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 129, at 337–38 (“But appointment or
retention of legal counsel does not necessarily ensure greater protection for the minor.
The standard problem for lawyers representing minors, whether in custody cases,
delinquency actions, neglect proceedings, or civil commitments is what model of
representation should be used: advocating the child’s wishes; determining the child’s
best interests and advocating those; or presenting options to the court as a neutral fact
finder.”).
362. A comparison to legal representation in the child welfare system is illustrative on this point. Although the Supreme Court has not recognized a federal due
process right to counsel for indigent parents in proceedings to involuntarily terminate
parental rights, most states guarantee such counsel. See Hollinger, supra note 79, at §
2.10[2]. Despite the general guarantee of legal representation, the role of the attorney
or guardian ad litem representing a minor parent charged with abuse or neglect remains uncertain. Professor Barbara Glesner Fines describes minor parents in the
child welfare system as caught in a “netherworld between protected and prosecuted,
between child and adult.” Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 336. Professor Glesner
Fines discusses the various challenges of this kind of representation, including “the
uncertainty of the client’s legal rights, the questions of the capacity of the child to
direct representation, the role and influence of other parties in these disputes, and the
systemic and personal biases present in representing teen parents.” Id. at 322; see
also Sankaran, A Hidden Crisis, supra note 356, at 38. Numerous scholars have argued for client-directed representation for minor parents in involuntary termination or
adoption relinquishment proceedings. See Seymore, supra note 160, at 147–55 (arguing that law should be reformed to require that minors relinquishing an infant for
adoption have independent legal counsel who represents her expressed wishes, and
that such counsel is preferable to appointment of guardian ad litem who makes his or
her own decisions about best interests for the minor parent).
Teen parents, even more than other children involved in the child welfare system, need to have a voice in the process and to be spared the most negative
psychological and legal consequences of a termination in which they were not
empowered to make decisions about the representation. When these same
teenagers are the subjects of custody or adoption actions, courts consider their
preferences, especially the choices of older teenagers.

Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 327. See also Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the “Right” Thing to Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 902–05 (2007)
(child-centered standard used in placement for abuse and neglect cases and in custody
litigation).
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This question – what role should the third party adult play in the minor’s
decision making – is a pitfall for any type of third party intervention. If the
law gives the third party adult decision-making power rather than limiting
him or her to a counseling role, then minors could still be subjected to restrictions on their rights and shamed for their sexual behavior. The aunt,
counselor, or lawyer could arbitrarily obstruct access to abortion care or pressure a minor to relinquish her infant for adoption as much as a parent or
judge. Furthermore, if reformed laws provided adolescents with a menu of
options for adult guidance, it would be necessary to ensure that the state provided the resources to cover the costs of independent counselors and attorneys. In child welfare law, a lack of sufficient resources to support teenage
and adult parents remains an endemic problem within the system. The resources question makes it especially difficult to support options like mentoring programs in the child welfare context.
Despite the risks and costs of implementing policy reforms incorporating third party adults into laws governing pregnant and parenting minors, it is
worth exploring these solutions in more detail. The law already recognizes
that in decisions related to sexuality and reproduction, parents may not be
able to fulfill their commonly understood role of acting in their children’s
best interests.363 Third party parental surrogates can serve as an alternative
that accounts for the in-between state of adolescence in particularly sensitive
contexts. In addition, third party parental surrogates could better effectuate
the stated goals of ensuring sound decision making and protecting children’s
well-being in situations where parental or state intervention may not serve
those goals.

***
The public and policy makers remain gripped by the intuition that many
adolescents would benefit from adult guidance in making consequential decisions. The law reflects this intuition in practices that force parental or state
oversight when minors choose abortion or parenthood. Although some adolescents can make decisions about abortion, parenting, and relinquishing their
child for adoption without being required to consult an adult, legal reforms
that incorporate third party adult involvement in these decisions could satisfy
the perceived need for pregnant or parenting teens to receive adult support
363. Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, supra note 114, at 133 (“[A]dolescents
may not want their parents involved in certain health care decisions, and, as a result,
they will avoid seeking treatment if parental consent is required. It is precisely this
fear that gave rise to the ‘mature minor’ exception . . . .”); Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, supra note 1, at 570 (“But should parents be legally excluded
from their traditional role of making important decisions for their minor children? In
many regards, the arguments for allowing minors to consent to abortion without involving their parents are similar to those made in support of minors’ consent statutes.
Here, as in the context of treatment for sexually transmitted diseases or substance
abuse, the interests of parents and children may conflict.”).
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and would provide options other than parental or state authority. Policy reforms that look to third party adults could help the law to explicitly
acknowledge and make room for the unique needs of adolescents by addressing the absence of supportive parents and providing alternatives to overly
restrictive state interventions that undermine minors’ reproductive rights.

V. CONCLUSION
Advancements in minors’ rights to autonomy in their reproductive decisions remain illusory. In its operation, the law takes a highly skeptical view
of adolescents’ reproductive decision making, whether they choose abortion
or childbirth. As enforced by state officials, the law on adolescent reproduction serves as a means to punish teenage girls’ sexuality and impose traditional gender norms, rather than a means to the purported goals of sound adolescent decision making and protecting children’s well-being.
While recent scientific research suggests that teenagers differ in their decision-making abilities from adults, “research also indicates that, when guided
by caring and competent adults, adolescents can make critical decisions for
themselves and their children.”364 Within the context of sexuality and reproduction, those caring adults may not always be the adolescents’ parents. Incorporating third party adults into laws governing pregnant or parenting adolescents offers much potential. By considering options that reside between
the extremes of complete autonomy or complete subjection to the authority of
parent and state, we could create much needed space for adolescence in the
law.

364. Glesner Fines, supra note 135, at 328.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/19

78

